Catholic University Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 4 Summer 2013

Article 2

2014

How Deep are the Springs of Obedience Norms that Bind the
Overseers of Charities?
Johnny R. Buckles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Johnny R. Buckles, How Deep are the Springs of Obedience Norms that Bind the Overseers of Charities?,
62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 913 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

How Deep are the Springs of Obedience Norms that Bind the Overseers of
Charities?
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law and Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center. The author thanks
Professor Evelyn Brody for helpful comments to a prior draft of this Article. The author also thanks the
University of Houston for its financial support of this Paper, and the author's wife, Tami Buckles, for her
constant support.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss4/2

HOW DEEP ARE THE SPRINGS OF OBEDIENCE NORMS
THAT BIND THE OVERSEERS OF CHARITIES?
Johnny Rex Buckles+
I. OBEDIENCE NORMS EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED ..................................920
A. The Basic Nature of Obedience Norms ..............................................920
B. A Framework for Obedience Norms Explained and Illustrated .........921
1. The Legality Norm .......................................................................921
2. The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm ...........................................921
3. The Static Charter Fidelity Norm ................................................922
4. The Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm ...........................................923
5. The Historic Mission Fidelity Norm ............................................923
6. The Charity Advancement Norm ..................................................924
C. Contexts for Applying Obedience Norms ...........................................925
1. Daily Operations..........................................................................925
2. Formal Amendments to Charter ..................................................925
3. Use of Funds to Further Post-Amendment Charter Purposes
or a New Mission......................................................................926
4. Distributions in Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charity ..........927
D. Co-Existence of Obedience Norms ....................................................927
II. OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING TRUSTEES OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS .....928
A. Trust Law in General .........................................................................928
1. The Charter Fidelity Norm Under General Trust Law ................928
2. The Legality Norm .......................................................................929
B. Charitable Trust Law .........................................................................929
1. The Charity Advancement Norm ..................................................929
2. Cy Pres, Equitable Deviation, the Legality Norm, and the
Static Charter Fidelity Norm ....................................................930
3. Mission Fidelity ...........................................................................931
III. OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS ...................................................................932
A. The Legality Norm..............................................................................932
B. Charter Fidelity Norms ......................................................................932
1. In General ....................................................................................932
2. The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm Predominates in the
Context of Formal Adoption of Charter Amendments ..............933

+
Professor of Law and Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center. The author
thanks Professor Evelyn Brody for helpful comments to a prior draft of this Article. The author
also thanks the University of Houston for its financial support of this Paper, and the author's wife,
Tami Buckles, for her constant support.

913

914

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:913

3. What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Use of Assets
Held Before and After a Charter Amendment? ........................934
a. The PLNO and Model Nonprofit Corporation Acts ............934
b. Case Law Supporting the Static Charter Fidelity Norm .....935
c. Case Law Supporting the Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm 940
4. What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Distribution
of Assets in Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charitable
Nonprofit Corporation? ...........................................................945
C. Mission Fidelity Norms ......................................................................946
1. Support for the Historic Mission Fidelity Norm ..........................947
2. Support for the Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm .........................948
D. The Charity Advancement Norm........................................................949
E. Summary.............................................................................................949
IV. THE PURPOSE OF OBEDIENCE NORMS ......................................................950
A. Public Benefit .....................................................................................950
B. Equity .................................................................................................952
C. Efficiency............................................................................................955
D. Summary ............................................................................................959
V. IMPLEMENTING FIDUCIARY OBEDIENCE NORMS ......................................959
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS ............................................................963
Deep Springs College offers a unique educational experience. Founded in
1917, the college sits on a cattle ranch and alfalfa farm in the High Desert of
California.1 The intellectually-gifted students of Deep Springs combine rigorous
academic study, manual labor, and self-governance to prepare for lives of
service and leadership.2 However, bright, young high school seniors seeking the
singular brand of liberal arts education offered by Deep Springs need not apply
if they are women.3 Who is responsible for this policy? It is not the overseers
of the college, who have determined that the school should admit students of

1. About Deep Springs, DEEP SPRINGS COLLEGE, http://www.deepsprings.edu/about (last
visited Sept. 30, 2013).
2. Id.
3. See Petition for Court Order Construing Trust Provisions, Or, If Necessary, Modifying
the Trust Instrument at 3, In re L.L. Nunn Trust, No. SICVPB 12-53232 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9,
2012) [hereinafter Petition], available at http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/Deep%20
Springs’%2020Initial%20Coeducation%20Petition,%206%20Feb%202012 (explaining that Deep
Springs has only admitted male students since it was founded).
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both sexes.4 Instead, a California court recently enjoined the school from
admitting female students in the first phase of lengthy litigation.5
The court issued the injunction after rejecting the college’s argument that
coeducation was permissible under a liberal construction of the 1923 Deed of
Trust (the Trust) that endowed the school with a small fortune and described the
school’s charitable purposes as being “for the education of promising young
men.”6 Further complicating the situation, a nonprofit corporation formed in
1967 began operating the school in 1996 after it received liquid assets and real
property from the original trust.7 The case, therefore, raises not only a trust
construction issue, but also issues concerning the degree to which the
corporation is bound by the original trust instrument, and whether (if the
corporation is bound) the trustees have established grounds for judicially
modifying the terms of trust. More broadly, the Deep Springs litigation raises
the poignant question of to what degree the law should require charity managers
to obey the precise charitable purposes historically advanced by the charities that
they govern.
The trustees of Deep Springs College, like directors and trustees of other
charitable organizations, are subject to two familiar fiduciary duties:8 the duty
4. See Press Release, Deep Springs College, Deep Springs College Has Decided to Admit
Women (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/DSPressRelease
091911.PDF (announcing that the trustees voted in favor of transitioning to a coeducational student
body).
5. See Scott Jaschik, Women Blocked at Deep Springs, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 11, 2013,
3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/11/judge-blocks-deep-springs-college
-admitting-women (providing a general synopsis of the litigation).
6. See id. (explaining that the court granted the injunction after concluding that, under the
terms of the 1923 trust, the school does not have the authority to admit women); see also Petition,
supra note 3, at 2–3 (explaining the terms of the trust).
7. See Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Interpretation of the L.L. Nunn Trust at 2, In re L.L.
Nunn Trust, No. SICVPB 12-53232 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/Coeducation-Litigation/2012-10-03%20Trustees%20
Opening%20Brief%20on%20Interpretation%20of%20the%20L.L.%20Nunn%20Trust.PDF.
8. An extensive academic literature discusses and analyzes regulation of charity fiduciaries
and the duties that they owe. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can
Teach About Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G.
Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A
Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 (2008); Evelyn Brody, Agents
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational
Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996) [hereinafter Agents Without Principals]; Evelyn Brody,
Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.
-KENT L. REV. 641 (2005); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV.
1400 (1998) [hereinafter The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law]; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public?
Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004)
[hereinafter Whose Public?]; Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance
and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001); Deborah
A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131 (1993);
Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance
Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99 (2007); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable
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Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218 (2003); Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Jonathan A. Lever, State
Regulation of Health Care Conversions and Conversion Foundations, 9 HEALTH L. REP. 714
(2000); Christopher W. Frost, Financing Public Health Through Nonprofit Conversion
Foundations, 90 KY. L.J. 935 (2002); Susan N. Gary, Is it Prudent to be Responsible? The Legal
Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.
L. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2011) [hereinafter Gary, Socially Responsible Investing]; Susan N. Gary,
Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW.
L. REV. 593 (1999) [hereinafter Gary, Trust Law]; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of
Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L.
631 (1998); Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin and Trust in the
Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2005); Henry
Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?,
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807 (1989); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit
Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should
Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2005); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227 (1999); Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit
Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1 (2000); Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the
Goose
is
not
Good
for
the
Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley
-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience:
The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director
Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser
& Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011 (2011); Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613 (2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007); John W.
Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney General, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243
(2004); Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1997); Jeremy
Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1677 (2009); Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (2003); Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the
Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1485 (2003).
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of loyalty9 and the duty of care10 (or prudent administration in the case of
charitable trusts).11 The law of trusts, including charitable trusts, also generally
9. Typically under state law, the extent of the duty of loyalty owed by charity fiduciaries
depends on whether the charity is a trust or a nonprofit corporation. State nonprofit statutes usually
require a director of a nonprofit charitable corporation to act in “good faith” and according to what
she believes (or reasonably believes) is in the “best interests of the corporation.” See, e.g., CAL.
CORP.
CODE
§
5231(a)
(West
2013);
FLA.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 617.0830(1)(a), (c) (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (LexisNexis 2009); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (West 1995);
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2012). If the interests of a charitable nonprofit
corporation conflict with the interests of directors and related persons, the duty of loyalty
encourages directors to follow procedural safeguards.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 5233(d)(2)(C) (West 1990) (precluding a claim if a majority of directors approved the transaction
that could pose a conflict of interest, so long as the directors knew all of the material facts and the
interested directors did not vote); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0832 (West 2013) (listing the procedural
safeguards necessary for a nonprofit corporation’s transaction where one or more directors has a
potential conflict of interest); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.60 (West 2010) (same); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 2005) (same); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §
22.230 (West 2012) (same); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60(a) (3d ed. 2009) (stating that a
conflict-of-interest transaction is not voidable if, in relevant part, the board of directors is informed
of the material facts relating to the conflict and a majority of disinterested directors approve the
transaction); id. § 8.31(a)(1)(ii) (stating that an interested director incurs no liability if the
procedures outlined in § 8.60 have been followed). Generally, there is no outright prohibition
against transactions between a director and the nonprofit corporation that she oversees. However,
in those jurisdictions that follow the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA),
loans are prohibited between a director or officer and the corporation that she oversees or manages.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32(a) (1987). An optional provision in the more
recent Model Act generally forbids such loans. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act 3d ed. § 8.32(a).
Under traditional trust law, trustees of charitable trusts are more strictly prohibited from
engaging in self-dealing than are corporate fiduciaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 78 cmt. a (2007) (“The duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to
the standards of other fiduciary relationships.”). The duty of loyalty “strictly prohibit[s]” the trustee
“from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a
conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests,” except in “discrete
circumstances.” Id. § 78(2).
10. As the duty of care is explained in the Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations,
a director must become adequately informed, devote appropriate attention to overseeing the
charity’s affairs, and “act with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably exercise
in a like position and under similar circumstances.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.
§ 315(a)–(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). Similarly, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act, in relevant part, requires a director to discharge her duties “with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.” REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2). Under the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition,
directors “must discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(b).
These standards are largely consistent with those set forth in many nonprofit corporation statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (requiring a director to act “with such care, including
reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0830(1)(b) (requiring a director to act “[w]ith the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances”); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (requiring a director to act “with such care as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position with respect to a similar corporation organized under this chapter would
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requires trustees to obey the terms of their trust.12 Essentially extending this
trust law requirement into charitable nonprofit corporate law, some
commentators, joined by at least one court, recognize a third distinct fiduciary
duty owed by fiduciaries13 of charitable nonprofit corporations: the duty of
obedience.14
Other commentators prefer to articulate fiduciary obedience norms governing
directors of charitable nonprofit corporations in terms of the duties of care and
loyalty, which must be exercised in good faith.15 Indeed, the American Law
use under similar circumstances”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2541(1) (West 2012) (stating
that a director must discharge her duties “with the degree of diligence, care, and skill which an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances in a like position”); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003) (mandating that a director “perform his
duties. . . in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (stating
that a director must act “with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (requiring a director to exercise
“reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (requiring a director to act “with
ordinary care”).
11. The standards associated with the duty of care governing directors of charitable nonprofit
corporations are similar to those found in traditional trust law’s duty of prudent administration,
which governs fiduciaries of charitable trusts. See Gary, Socially Responsible Investing, supra note
8, at 117–19. Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee is required “to administer the trust
as a prudent person would, in light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1). In administering the trust in compliance with this duty,
the trustee generally must exercise “reasonable care, skill, and caution.” Id. § 77(2).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 75–76, 88.
13. A charity fiduciary is one who oversees or manages a charitable entity, including a trustee
of a charitable trust, a director of a charitable corporation, or an officer of a charitable entity.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.at § 300 cmt. a.
14. See, e.g., In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595
(Sup. Ct. 1999) (explaining that the duty of obedience requires the board of directors to “seek to
preserve its original mission”); VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND ET. AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW
AND PRACTICE: WITH TAX ANALYSIS 413–14 (1997); DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY:
GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 21 (1988) (“[T]he duty of obedience requires that a director
act with fidelity, within the bounds of the law generally, to the organization’s ‘mission,’ as
expressed in its charter and by-laws.”); Fishman, supra note 8, at 237–39 (stating that directors of
charitable nonprofit corporations have a duty of obedience, which “mandates that the board refrain
from transactions and activities that are ultra vires, that is, beyond the corporation’s powers and
purposes as expressed in its certificate of incorporation” and continuing that “a nonprofit
corporation and its directors and officers have the responsibility to comply with the law”); Palmiter,
supra note 8, at 466 (“The duty of obedience has a . . . pedigree in the non-profit corporation. It is
regularly mentioned along with the duties of care and loyalty.”). For analyses of the scope and
purpose of the duty of obedience, see generally Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of
Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 47–54 (2008) (exploring the depth, breadth, and length of the
duty of obedience and its development in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
15. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 641 (“[T]he analytical approach of this Article,
consistent with for-profit case law, is to treat obedience to the bounds of the law and to the
organization’s mission as special functions of directors and officers to which general duty of care
standards apply.”); see also Manny, supra note 8, at 20 (“There is some question as to whether [the
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Institute’s Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (PLNO) expressly
declines to recognize either a distinct duty of obedience or certain limitations on
fiduciary behavior that the duty is understood to entail.16 Perhaps reflecting the
divergence of opinion on the merits of various obedience norms, there is no
consensus among commentators as to which view of the duty of obedience
commands the greater scholarly imprimatur.17
However, deciding whether the law should articulate a distinct duty of
obedience owed by all charity fiduciaries may be less important than identifying
and analyzing the obedience norms that do, or should, govern charity
fiduciaries—under whichever duty they may fall. The law’s choice of obedience
norms dictates how easily charity managers, such as the trustees of Deep Springs
College, can adapt to their surroundings. It also largely determines the degree
to which charity fiduciaries or state actors control the operations of charitable
entities..
TThis Article explores whether and how the exercise of discretion by charity
fiduciaries in recasting a charity’s direction is, and should be, limited.
Analyzing this basic issue raises additional, difficult inquiries: If the law does
limit the ability of charity fiduciaries to determine the charitable paths of their
entities, what standards govern the exercise of fiduciary discretion? To what
extent does , and should, the law treat fiduciaries of charitable trusts dissimilarly
from those who govern charitable nonprofit corporations? What role should
governmental actors play in monitoring these decisions by charity managers? If
governmental actors should assume some monitoring role, should their review
of fiduciary decisions be ex ante or ex post? Which governmental actors should
be involved? Can donors and other stakeholders sufficiently protect their
interests absent a strong supervisory role by the government?
These questions are not simply esoteric enigmas designed to tickle the ears18
of legal scholars. As the Deep Springs community is well aware, these questions

duty of obedience] actually exists as a separate duty, or whether it is best described as an element
of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care as applied to non-profit organizations.”). Cf. Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 479, 491 (2010) (observing that “there is
general agreement that charity leaders owe their organizations two duties under state laws: care and
loyalty” and acknowledging the debate as to whether a distinct duty of obedience exists).
16. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS § 300 cmt. g(3); see also MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND
REGULATION 226 (2004) (“To the extent the duty of obedience does not carry with it a duty to
assure that the trust is meeting contemporaneous needs, it does not set forth an appropriate
standard.”).
17. Compare Sugin, supra note 8, at 897–98 (stating that “the future of the duty of obedience
is very much at risk” and that “[i]t is not surprising that the duty of obedience fails the popularity
contest”), with Mayer & Wilson, supra note 15 (stating that “[t]here also appears to be an emerging
consensus that a third duty, that of obedience, also applies” to charity fiduciaries).
18. The phrase alludes to 2 Timothy 4:3–4 (New American Standard) (“For the time will come
when they will not endure sound doctrine; but wanting to have their ears tickled, they will
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matter greatly. Moreover, these questions are especially timely, for the law of
obedience norms governing fiduciaries of charitable corporations is unsettled
and in great need of refinement.19 Even the law governing trustees of charitable
trusts, which is comparatively stable and uniform, merits reassessment once the
meaning and purposes of obedience norms are thoroughly examined.
To foster the development of the law governing charity fiduciaries, this
Article presents a taxonomy of obedience norms,20 a doctrinal analysis of these
norms, and a policy discussion to help answer these questions. Part I explains
the fundamental nature of obedience norms and articulates and illustrates the
various types of obedience norms. Parts II and III discuss legal authorities
supporting or rejecting various obedience norms as applied to trustees of
charitable trusts and directors of charitable nonprofit corporations, respectively.
Part IV this Article evaluates the policy considerations that may justify one or
more obedience norms. Finally, by presenting an analytical series of questions,
Part V explains how the law should develop in imposing, and declining to
impose, obedience norms on charity fiduciaries.
I. OBEDIENCE NORMS EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED
A. The Basic Nature of Obedience Norms
Fundamentally, an obedience norm simply requires a charity fiduciary, such
as a director, trustee, or officer, to govern or manage her charity in compliance
with some limitation or norm imposed on the charity’s activity.21 For example,
a charitable organization must not undertake an illegal activity.22 By
implication, a charity fiduciary must govern so as not to cause her charity to act
accumulate for themselves teachers in accordance to their own desires, and will turn away their
ears from the truth and will turn aside to myths.”).
19. See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 46, 97 (stating that legal authorities are “seriously divided”
as to whether a strong form of the duty of obedience applies in the case of charitable corporations
and characterizing the relevant law as “a muddle”); Fremont-Smith & Lever, supra note 8, at 717
(“In some states, the attorney general’s common law authority over healthcare conversions and
conversion foundations is unclear, in which case legislation may indeed be needed to clarify the
attorney general’s power.”); Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58–59 (opining that states should
not employ a trust law approach to the management of charitable corporations and observing that
“[m]ost state courts facing this issue today are doing so for the first time”); Harold L. Kaplan,
Patrick S. Coffey, & Rosemary G. Feit, The “Charitable Trust” Doctrine: Lessons and Aftermath
of Banner Health, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 3 (stating that “[t]he far-reaching impacts of
the charitable-trust theory on the operation of nonprofit healthcare organizations . . . cannot be
overstated” and noting that “the law remains in flux”); Manny, supra note 8, at 20 (describing the
duty of obedience as “a rather nebulous duty to carry out the mission of the organization”).
20. The framework of obedience norms expounded upon in this Article appears in embryonic
form in Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of Fiduciary Obedience Norms in Tax Laws
Governing Charities: An Introduction to State Law Concepts and an Analysis of Their Implications
for Federal Tax Law, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 197 (2012).
21. Fishman, supra note 8, at 237.
22. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2, & III.A.
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illegally.23 Similarly, a charitable trustee must administer her trust in accordance
with the terms of the trust instrument,24 and a director of a nonprofit corporation
must govern in a manner that is consistent with the charity’s articles of
incorporation and bylaws.25 In each case, the trustee or director must “obey”
something: the law or the charity’s governing instrument(s).26
B. A Framework for Obedience Norms Explained and Illustrated
In order to better analyze the degree to which the law should subject charity
fiduciaries to various obedience norms, it is helpful to identify those norms that
the law definitely imposes, and those that some might think the law does or
should impose, on charity fiduciaries.27
1. The Legality Norm
The requirement that fiduciaries ensure that their charities operate lawfully is
referred to as the “legality norm.” The legality norm plainly applies to both
charitable trusts28 and charitable nonprofit corporations.29
2. The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm
The dynamic charter fidelity norm requires “fiduciaries to ensure that a charity
operates in accordance with its governing instrument” (such as a trust instrument
or certificate of formation/articles of incorporation), including its purposes
clause.30 The charity’s members, the fiduciaries themselves, or both acting
together may amend the governing instrument.31 These groups may act under
the terms of the proposed changes before receiving “ex ante substantive
approval.”32 Ex ante substantive approval refers to approval by a governmental

23. See infra text accompanying notes 80–81.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2003).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103–05.
26. See e.g., Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 44 (“Broadly construed, the duty of
obedience expresses the obligation of nonprofit directors to observe and advance the mission of the
charitable corporation by adhering to its purposes, usually as set forth in the entity’s articles of
incorporation or bylaws. However, in the few instances in which it is specifically mentioned by
courts, it has been invoked to indicate directors’ responsibility to assure that their corporations obey
the law and not stray from the dictates of the purposes expressed in their articles and bylaws.”);
Mayer & Wilson, supra note 15, at 493 (“The duty of obedience, whether treated as a separate duty
or as part of the duties of care and loyalty, requires charity leaders to ensure the charity both obeys
applicable laws and complies with the provisions of its governing documents, including its stated
mission.”).
27. While most of the concepts underlying these norms appear in statutes, case law, and legal
commentary, the terminology in this section is largely original with the author.
28. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 203, 215.
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actor who must evaluate a proposed amendment before it is deemed legally
effective, according to legal criteria for determining the justifiability of the
amendment.33
Ex ante substantive approval is distinguishable from approval based solely on
a charity’s compliance with procedural rules for amending its governing
instrument. For example, an entity may amend its charter under typical state
nonprofit corporation laws if it follows certain procedures.34 Although an
amendment is generally not effective unless the entity observes the statutory
procedures, the state does not normally undertake a substantive review of the
proposed amendments under the typical statute.35 In contrast, under the common
law of charitable trusts, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise,
deviations from the terms of trust typically require court approval.36
3. The Static Charter Fidelity Norm
The “static charter fidelity norm” requires fiduciaries to “ensure that a charity
operates in accordance with its governing instrument—as it was originally
drafted and as it may be amended only with the [ex ante] substantive approval
of a governmental actor.”37 It is important to note that this is the static charter
fidelity norm, thus emphasizing that charity fiduciaries cannot unilaterally
deviate from the terms of their charter merely by following certain procedures.
Rather, they may amend charter purposes and act in accordance with amended
charter terms only if a governmental actor (typically a court) authorizes such
action after substantively reviewing the justifiability of a proposed change to the
charity’s governing instrument.38
The static charter fidelity norm typically governs charitable trusts.39
Therefore, if a charitable trust is formed for the express purpose of treating
people suffering from a particular disease, but medical advances render the
charity’s fulfillment of this purpose impossible or impracticable, the charity’s
trustees may petition a court in a cy pres proceeding to authorize the trust to

33. Id. at 215 n.100.
34. See infra text accompanying note 107.
35. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 215 n.100 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 4.002(a) (West 2011) (conditioning the filing of instruments on whether or not the instrument
complies with the statutory requirements).
36. See infra Part II.B.2.
37. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203.
38. See id. at 203 n.28 (“Notwithstanding that this norm allows for amendments to a charity’s
governing instrument if a governmental actor approves them, it is appropriately described as ‘static’
charter fidelity. Acting alone, fiduciaries bound by this norm cannot cause the charity to deviate
from the terms of its governing instrument. Thus, from the perspective of fiduciaries who desire to
amend the governing instrument but cannot obtain the necessary governmental approval to do so,
the governing instrument is ‘static.’”).
39. See infra Part II.B.2.
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fulfill a different charitable purpose.40 In such a case, the trustees are subject to
the static charter fidelity norm because they are not authorized to alter the
purposes of the trust without first petitioning a court.
4. The Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm
The term “dynamic mission fidelity norm” reflects “a requirement that
fiduciaries cause their charities to operate in accordance with the charities’
precise charitable mission(s) as the governing board expands, contracts, or
otherwise alters the mission(s) from time to time.”41 In this context, “charitable
mission” refers to the specific charitable objectives that a charity maintains in
carrying out its customarily broader purposes articulated in the purposes clause
of its governing instrument.42 For example, consider an entity organized for
“charitable purposes,” including “the purpose of benefiting the community by
providing health care and promoting the health” of residents of a certain
geographic region. Assume that the entity’s board has resolved to create and
operate a children’s hospital in furtherance of the entity’s charter purposes.
Operation of the children’s hospital is the mission of the entity. Under the
dynamic mission fidelity norm, the governing board is free to alter the mission
of the entity over time (for example, by resolving to turn the children’s hospital
into a general hospital), but the board must govern the entity so as to advance
whatever mission is in place until the board has officially changed that mission.
5. The Historic Mission Fidelity Norm
As an alternative to advancing the dynamic mission fidelity norm, the law
could require fiduciaries to ensure that “their charities [] operate in accordance
with the charities’ precise historic missions, which may be far more limited than
the purposes for which they are expressly organized under their governing
instruments”—the “historic mission fidelity norm.”43 Under this norm,
deviating from the historic mission of the charity requires ex ante substantive
approval from a governmental actor.44 Thus, consider the example of the
children’s hospital. If fiduciaries are bound by the historic mission fidelity
norm, they may not turn the children’s hospital into a general hospital simply by
resolving to do so. Rather, they must first seek approval from an appropriate
state official or body (most likely a court) to change the entity’s mission, even

40. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that the doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation
permit charitable trustees to deviate from the terms of the charitable trust in certain circumstances,
but that this deviation is conditioned on court approval).
41. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203–04.
42. Id. at 202. Distinguishing between a charity’s specific mission and its charter purposes is
common. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 320 cmt. e; DiPietro, supra note 8, at
121–25.
43. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203.
44. See id. at 223.

924

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:913

though the purposes articulated in the entity’s charter are plainly broad enough
to encompass operating a general hospital.
6. The Charity Advancement Norm
Perhaps the most basic obedience norm, upon which all others rest, is what
this Article shall term the “charity advancement norm.” As charity fiduciaries
seek to forge a clear charitable path for their entities, their choices are
determined in part by state law’s imposition of charter fidelity and mission
fidelity norms. Although there is some variance as to the specificity and
mutability of charitable purposes vis-à-vis obedience norms, all of the norms
require “that charity fiduciaries act so as to advance charitable purposes.”45 Each
norm discussed requires fiduciaries to “drive” charities in a “general charitable
direction.”46 Consequently, a constitutive norm underlying the others may be
called the “charity advancement norm.”
The charity advancement norm implies a restraint, which prohibits charity
fiduciaries from primarily advancing a non-charitable purpose. 47 The restraint
is simply the negative corollary of the norm itself. The negative corollary of the
charity advancement norm, like the norm proper, is constitutive of other
obedience norms. A course of action by charity fiduciaries that violates the
negative corollary of the charity advancement norm would generally also betray
the other obedience norms identified in this Article, such as the dynamic charter
fidelity, static charter fidelity, historic mission fidelity, and dynamic mission
fidelity norms.48 Furthermore, the negative corollary of the charity advancement
norm and the legality norm reinforce one another, because operating illegally is
generally inconsistent with advancing only charitable purposes.49

45. Id. at 212.
46. Id. There are two elements of the charity advancement norm. Id. at 212 n.90. First,
charity fiduciaries must “cause the charity to advance a purpose” (the element of “propelling”). Id.
Second, charity fiduciaries must ensure that the purpose advanced by the charity is, in fact,
charitable (the element of “steering”). Id.
47. Id. Cf. Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2
(2011) (“To be a charity, an organization must pursue a charitable mission as its dominant and
overriding purpose.”).
48. Buckles, supra note 20, at 213. However, truly minimal advancement of a
non–charitable purpose does not necessarily negate adherence to obedience norms. Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1) (2008) (stating that an organization is not operated exclusively for tax–
exempt purposes under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code “if more than an insubstantial
part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose”).
49. Buckles, supra note 20, at 213.
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C. Contexts for Applying Obedience Norms
Obedience norms apply in a variety of circumstances.
discussion identifies several of these contexts.50

The following

1. Daily Operations
Obedience norms limit the options available to fiduciaries as they oversee
the charity’s routine operations.51 For example, the legality norm requires
fiduciaries to manage the charity so as to ensure that it operates lawfully.52
Similarly, charter fidelity norms constrain charitable choices contemplated by
charity managers, and mission fidelity norms prevent a charity from straying
from a pre-approved charitable pathway as it conducts daily operations.
Certain obedience norms not only preclude charity managers from advancing
illegitimate purposes, but also require them to act positively.53 For example, the
charity advancement norm requires fiduciaries to oversee the charity’s
operations to ensure that it indeed serves a charitable purpose.54 The charter
fidelity norms can be understood to impose a duty on charity managers to
manage their charity so that it actually fulfills the purposes set forth in its
charter.55 Similarly, the mission fidelity norms may be seen as requiring charity
fiduciaries to ensure that their charity carries out its specific charitable mission.56
2. Formal Amendments to Charter
A state’s choice between the two charter fidelity norms determines the ease
with which a charity can amend its governing instrument.57 Under the dynamic
charter fidelity norm, a charity can amend its governing instrument, including
its purposes clause, much more easily than a charity constrained by the static
charter fidelity norm. Under the latter, fiduciaries who wish to change the terms
of the charity’s governing instrument must first receive permission from a
governmental actor, such as a court—permission that may be granted only after
the governmental actor has reviewed the justifiability of the change. The

50. These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. Other contexts requiring a choice of
obedience norms include dispositions of a significant portion of an institution’s assets, and
corporate combinations,such as mergers.
51. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 212 (explaining ways in which the various norms might
constrain directors of a charity).
52. Id. at 203.
53. See id. at 212–13 (noting that several norms share the requirement that charity fiduciaries
must “propel” the charity “in a general charitable direction”).
54. See supra Part I.B.6.
55. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 n.17 (Del. 1991) (referring to “the special
duty of the fiduciaries of a charitable corporation to protect and advance its charitable purpose”).
56. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 8, at 904–05 (advocating for the adoption of a legal
requirement that directors seek to follow and carry out the charitable mission of the organization,
even when contrary to the original statements in the organization’s charter).
57. For a discussion of statutory law specifically addressing this issue, see infra Part III.B.2.
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dynamic charter fidelity norm, in contrast, allows fiduciaries to amend the
charity’s charter without first submitting the change to state actors for
substantive review.58
3. Use of Funds to Further Post-Amendment Charter Purposes or a New
Mission
Changes to a charity’s purposes clause and modifications to a charity’s
mission present a very interesting legal issue: May funds held by the charity
prior to the change in charter purposes (or mission) be used to further the
charity’s new charter purposes (or new mission)?59 To articulate this issue is to
recognize that the choice of charter fidelity norm, as well as the choice of
mission fidelity norm, affects much more than merely the method by which
charity fiduciaries can initiate changes to the charity’s formal purposes and
mission.
To illustrate, assume that the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs formal
amendments to a charity’s governing instrument. Under this norm, as long as
the charity’s governing board follows the procedures set forth in state statutory
law, the board is free to alter the express purposes for which the charity is
organized. However, that the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs the
charity’s formal ability to amend its charter does not necessarily mandate that
the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs the charity’s ability to use
pre-amendment assets to further post-amendment purposes. Conceivably, state
law could instead apply the static charter fidelity norm to the
post-charter-amendment use of assets held before the charter amendment.60
Similarly, a legal question arises as to whether the charity can devote assets held
prior to the change in mission to advance its new mission, even if a formal
charter amendment is not necessary when the governing board changes the
charity’s mission. The charity would not be free to do so if the historic mission
fidelity norm, rather than the dynamic mission fidelity norm, governs the use of
assets held prior to the change in mission.61

58. See supra Part I.B.2. As observed previously, state laws imposing merely procedural
requirements for amending a charter, such as those mandating advance notice of proposed
amendments to those with voting privileges and those requiring that resolutions adopting
amendments be filed with state agencies, involve no substantive review by state actors and are
therefore consistent with the dynamic charter fidelity norm. Id.
59. See infra Part III.B.3. (providing a discussion of legal authorities specifically addressing
this issue).
60. See e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (applying
the dynamic charter fidelity norm to the organization’s amendment to its charter but strongly
suggesting in dicta that the static charter fidelity norm should apply to the post-charter
-amendment use of the assets the organization held before the amendment to the charter).
61. See supra Part I.B.5. (explaining that, under the historic mission fidelity norm, deviating
from the historic mission of the charity requires ex ante substantive approval from a governmental
actor).
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4. Distributions in Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charity
A related issue is whether a charity seeking to dissolve itself may, pursuant to
a plan of dissolution, transfer its assets to another charity with a mission different
from that in its own charter.62 If the state statute governing distributions in
dissolution expressly requires the dissolving entity to transfer its assets to other
charities with purposes similar to the longstanding express purposes of the
dissolving entity,63 the statute at least partially embraces the static charter
fidelity norm. The transferee must devote assets received from the dissolving
entity in accordance with the transferee’s charter—one that sets forth purposes
similar to those of the dissolving entity’s charter. In effect, because the two
entities have similar charter purposes, such a state statute requires vicarious
fidelity to the dissolved entity’s charter.
If, however, the state statute does not explicitly require a dissolving entity to
distribute assets to only charitable transferees with similar purposes,64 the state
courts must decide whether to employ common law trust concepts to compel
such a result. To empower directors to authorize distributions in dissolution to
a charity with purposes dissimilar to those of the dissolving charity effectively
enables directors to select new charter terms that will govern distributed assets.
Hence, directors with such authority are functioning under the dynamic charter
fidelity norm. In contrast, if the courts require the dissolving entity to distribute
assets to a charity with a similar purpose, the courts, in part, embrace the static
charter fidelity norm in the context of dissolution and liquidation.65 Similarly,
if courts specifically require the transferee entity to operate similarly to the
liquidating entity, the court embraces the historic mission fidelity norm.
D. Co-Existence of Obedience Norms
Some of these obedience norms can co-exist together, while others are
incompatible.66 The legality norm is consistent to some degree with every other
norm, although it establishes boundaries for a charity’s express charter purposes
and mission. The dynamic charter fidelity norm and the static charter fidelity
norm are mutually exclusive in any single context, as are the historic mission
fidelity norm and the dynamic mission fidelity norm.
However, to embrace one of the charter norms to the exclusion of the other
does not necessarily require one to adopt its most analogous mission fidelity
norm. Thus, theoretically, a state that has adopted the static charter fidelity norm
need not necessarily adopt the historic mission fidelity norm. A charity’s

62. See infra Part III.B.4. (discussing case law specifically addressing this issue).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1002-a(c)(1) (McKinney 2013) (requiring
that corporate assets be transferred to an organization “engaged in activities substantially similar to
those of the dissolved corporation”).
64. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.304(a)(2) (West 2012).
65. Buckles, supra note 20, at 208–09.
66. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 212.
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proposed change in mission may be quite consistent with broadly-phrased
charter purposes. The static charter fidelity norm limits the range of options
available to directors seeking to alter a charity’s mission, but it does not literally
compel adherence to any specific mission.67 In contrast, to embrace the dynamic
charter fidelity norm in one context virtually requires rejection of the historic
mission fidelity norm in the same context. For example, if directors are dutybound to follow the charity’s historic mission after a charter amendment to grant
them formal authority to amend general charter purposes seems rather pointless.
Finally, norms that are mutually exclusive in the same context are not
necessarily mutually exclusive when applied in different contexts. Thus, one
theoretically could embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm in the context of
formally approving charter amendments, but favor the static charter fidelity
norm as applied to the post-amendment use of funds held by the charity both
before and after the amendment, or as applied to distributions in liquidation of
the charity.
II. OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING TRUSTEES OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
A. Trust Law in General
From the perspective of trustees, the law of private trusts largely subsumes
the norm of static charter fidelity, circumscribed by the legality norm.
1. The Charter Fidelity Norm Under General Trust Law
Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee “has a duty to administer
the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of trust and
applicable law.”68 The official Comment to the Restatement refers to the duty
as “[t]he normal duty of a trustee to obey the terms of trust.”69 Although a trust
can often be amended with the consent of all beneficiaries (or, in some cases,
with the consent of the beneficiaries and the settlor),70 a trustee who believes an
amendment is prudent generally may not unilaterally amend the trust instrument
absent explicit authority in the trust instrument to do so.71 A petition for judicial
modification of the trust must be filed, and relief is available only in limited
circumstances.72 To require a trustee to obey the terms of trust is, of course, to
67. Id. In general, “[t]his conclusion holds unless the charter purposes are so detailed that
they effectively define the specific mission of the charity.” Id. at 212 n.88.
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007).
69. Id. § 76, cmt. b(1).
70. See, e.g, id. § 65(1) (permitting modification of the trust with the consent of all
beneficiaries).
71. See, e.g., id. § 64(1) (allowing a trustee to modify the terms of trust only as granted by the
trust itself).
72. See id. § 66(2) (noting that the trustee must petition the court to deviate from or modify
the terms of trust); see also, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-26(a) (LexisNexis 2011); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7740.2 (West 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054 (West 2007).
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require “charter fidelity.” Further, to permit trustees to act contrary to those
terms only by petitioning a court to authorize a trust amendment is to embrace
the static charter fidelity norm.
2. The Legality Norm
The law of trusts also embraces the legality norm by invalidating trust terms
that are illegal or contrary to public policy.73 Moreover, a trustee is not under a
duty to comply with a trust provision that is unlawful or contrary to public
policy; indeed, the trustee is generally under a duty not to comply with such a
provision.74
B. Charitable Trust Law
1. The Charity Advancement Norm
Trust law permits the creation of charitable trusts, which, unlike private trusts,
are not formed primarily to benefit identified or ascertainable beneficiaries.75 A
trust’s purpose is considered charitable “if its accomplishment is of such social
interest or benefit to the community as to justify permitting the property to be
devoted to the purpose in perpetuity and to justify the various other special
privileges that are typically allowed to charitable trusts.”76 A trust can be
“charitable” even if it does not designate a particular charitable purpose or mode
for achieving charitable purposes.77 Thus, a trust organized simply for
“charitable purposes” is a charitable trust.78
Almost tautologically, to require a trustee to administer a “charitable” trust
according to its terms is to implement the charity advancement norm. Charitable
trusts are accorded special treatment in virtue of their “charitable purposes”
expressed in the terms of trust, according to which trustees must administer their
trusts.79 Therefore, to require a trustee to administer a charitable trust according
to its terms is to compel adherence to the charity advancement norm.

73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(a) (stating that a trust or trust provision
is invalid if “its purpose is unlawful or its performance calls for the commission of a criminal or
tortious act”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (1959) (“An intended trust or a provision
in the terms of a trust is invalid if illegal.”); id. § 61 (“An intended trust or a provision in the terms
of trust is invalid if the performance of the trust or of the provision involves the commission of a
criminal or tortious act by the trustee.”).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 72 cmts. a–b.
75. See id. §§27–28 (noting that trusts can be formed either for charitable or private purposes,
and providing a list of acceptable charitable purposes).
76. Id. § 28 cmt. a.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. (explaining that charitable trusts are “favored” in various ways).
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2. Cy Pres, Equitable Deviation, the Legality Norm, and the Static Charter
Fidelity Norm
Charitable trusts are also governed by the legality and static charter fidelity
norms. The terms of charitable trusts, like other trusts, must not be unlawful,80
and their trustees generally must obey lawful trust terms.81 The law of charitable
trusts also embraces both the legality and static charter fidelity norms through
the doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation. The doctrine of cy pres allows
trustees to deviate from the dispositive terms of a charitable trust only in limited
circumstances, and only with advance judicial approval.82 Under the traditional
doctrine of cy pres, a court may direct charity fiduciaries to apply charitable trust
funds to purposes similar to the original trust purposes if accomplishing the
original purposes becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal, as long as the
transferor of the funds has manifested an intent to devote the funds to charitable
purposes more general than the frustrated specific charitable purpose.83 The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code generally follows the
traditional doctrine of cy pres, but adds wastefulness to the grounds for applying
the doctrine and presumes that a donor possesses general charitable intent.84
80. Id. § 28 cmt. f.
81. See id. § 76 (imposing a general duty on all trustees to administer the trust according to
its terms and the law); see also id. § 76 cmt. b(1) (stating that this duty applies when the terms of
trust have been reformed or modified under section 67 of the Restatement, which applies only to
charitable trusts).
82. See id. § 67 (stating that if a charitable trust “becomes unlawful, impossible or impractical
to carry out . . . or to the extent it is or becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated
purpose . . . then a court will direct application of [trust] property or appropriate portion thereof to
a charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose”); AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET
AL., 6 SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 39.5.2 (5th ed. 2009) (stating that cy pres may be applied
when it “is unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful to carry out” the settlor’s particular
charitable purposes).
83. Sharpless v. Medford Monthly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of Friends, 548 A.2d 1157,
1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). Cf.
RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 438 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that the doctrine applies when, in relevant part,
furthering the charitable use intended by the donor “is or becomes impossible or impractical”); id.
§ 436 (“The courts that have applied judicial cy pres to a charitable trust have usually required that
the settlor have exhibited a general or broad charitable intent in addition to the particular purpose
served by that trust.”); SCOTT, supra note 82 (stating that a court may apply cy pres when it “is
unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful” to fulfill the settlor’s particular charitable
purposes). Some sources articulate the doctrine as involving three prongs: (1) the settlor
gratuitously transferred property in trust for a designated charitable purpose; (2) carrying out the
designated purposes of the gift is, or becomes, impossible, impracticable, or illegal; and (3) the
trustor manifested a general intention to devote the gifted property to charitable purposes. See 15
AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 146 (2011). See generally SCOTT, supra note 82, § 39.5 (discussing the
cy pres doctrine).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 & cmt. b (2003) (describing the modern rule
as “displacing the traditional quest for a settlor’s ‘general charitable intent’ when the trust” is silent
on the issue); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 & cmt. (2010) (explaining that modern doctrine differs
from the traditional doctrine in that it presumes that the donor possessed a general charitable intent).
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Closely related to the doctrine of cy pres is the doctrine of deviation (or
“equitable deviation”). This latter doctrine empowers a court to direct a trustee
of a charitable trust to deviate from the administrative terms of a trust if
compliance with the original terms is impossible or illegal, or if compliance with
the terms of trust would substantially impede the accomplishment of trust
purposes on account of circumstances that the settlor did not foresee.85
In summary, unless the original charitable purposes fail on account of
illegality, impossibility, impracticability, or wastefulness, trustees of charitable
trusts must obey the express charitable purposes for which the settlor created the
trust. Further, if the trustees believe that the grounds for applying cy pres exist,
they must petition a court before straying from the express terms of trust. A
similar rule applies if trustees wish to depart from the administrative terms of
trust. The default rules governing charitable trusts thereby adopt a strong form
of the static charter fidelity norm, as limited by the legality norm.
3. Mission Fidelity
The common law of charitable trusts does not appear to articulate any mission
fidelity norm that is distinct from static charter fidelity. Of course, the trustees
of a charitable trust are generally bound by the terms of trust, as expressed in the
trust instrument. A charitable trust may be drafted so as to articulate a very
specific charitable purpose, one that might qualify as a charitable “mission,” as
the term is commonly employed. A trustee desiring to alter that specific mission
must petition a court in cy pres proceedings and establish the grounds for
applying the doctrine.86 The salient fact is that any such action is necessary only
when the charitable “mission” is articulated in the trust instrument. The doctrine
of cy pres applies only when “property is placed in trust to be applied to a
designated charitable purpose.”87 If no “designated” charitable purpose fails,
there is no basis for petitioning a court to amend the terms of the charitable trust.
Accordingly, the common law doctrine of cy pres does not contemplate judicial
scrutiny of mere changes in charitable mission that fall within the scope of broad
charitable purposes articulated in the trust instrument.

85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) & cmt. c (expanding the doctrine to
authorize deviation from terms that are not merely administrative); see, e.g., MacCurdy-Salisbury
Educ. Fund v. Killian, 309 A.2d 11, 13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (applying the doctrine of
deviation to minimize adverse federal excise tax consequences of accumulating trust income).
86. See supra Part II.B.2.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
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III. OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS
The typical nonprofit corporation statute imposes no express “duty of
obedience” on directors of charitable nonprofit corporations.88 Nonetheless,
state nonprofit laws embrace a variety of obedience norms.
A. The Legality Norm
Nonprofit corporations, like other entities, are typically required to act in
accordance with the law.89 Fiduciaries who deliberately cause an entity to act
unlawfully would presumably breach their statutory fiduciary duties.90
Consequently, state corporation laws embrace the legality norm.
B. Charter Fidelity Norms
1. In General
State nonprofit corporation laws also adopt norms of charter fidelity.
Directors of a nonprofit charitable corporation must not cause the entity they
govern to act contrary to its corporate purposes.91 Accordingly, under the 1987
88. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2013) (setting forth fiduciary standards
governing directors); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0830 (1) (West 2007) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2010) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2541 (West 2012) (same);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (LexisNexis 2009) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5712(a) (West 1995) (same).
89. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.003(1)(A) (West 2012) (stating that a domestic
entity may not take part in an “activity that is expressly unlawful or prohibited by a law of this
state”). Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7111 (West 2013) (stating that a corporation may be formed “for
any lawful purpose”); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-825 (2011) (stating that a Virginia nonstock
corporation generally “has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity”).
90. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.113(a) (West 2012) (stating that the statutory section
specifying a domestic entity’s powers “does not authorize . . . a managerial official of a domestic
entity to exercise a power in a manner inconsistent with a limitation on the purposes or powers of
the entity contained in . . . this code, or other law of this state”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“A failure to act in good faith may be shown
. . . where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law. . . .”); In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating, in the context of a dispute
involving a for-profit corporation, that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render
a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards”).
91. Cf., e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.113(a) (2012) (stating that the statutory section
specifying a domestic entity’s powers “does not authorize . . . a managerial official of a domestic
entity to exercise a power in a manner inconsistent with a limitation on the purposes or powers of
the entity contained in its governing documents”). Thus, in Texas, the state attorney general may
sue to enjoin any such action, and a corporation may sue a director who causes a corporation to act
outside of its corporate purposes. Id. § 20.002(c)(2), (c)(3)(B). Ohio law provides similarly. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.12(I)(1)(a)–(b) (2013) (permitting the state to bring an action against
the corporation, or permitting the corporation to bring suit against a member, officer, or director).
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Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) and the more recent
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition (MNCA Third), certain
lawsuits are contemplated when a corporation is alleged to have acted outside of
its powers.92 Therefore, both model acts implicitly require directors to obey their
corporate charters.93
Some authorities have also recognized a positive duty imposed on directors to
advance the charitable purposes of the corporations they oversee.94 A question
that arises is whether this duty is better expressed in terms of the dynamic charter
fidelity norm or the static charter fidelity norm.
2. The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm Predominates in the Context of
Formal Adoption of Charter Amendments
State nonprofit corporation statutes typically permit amendments to corporate
charters, including purposes clauses, as long as the entity follows the proper
internal procedures.95 In other words, the typical nonprofit corporation statute
does not forbid members or directors from changing the historic charter purposes
of an incorporated charity.96 Thus, state nonprofit corporation statutes
commonly appear to embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied to the
formal requirements for amending a corporate charter.97
Like many states, the PLNO embraces the dynamic charter fidelity norm.
Under the PLNO, a charity fiduciary must cause the charity to obey the law and
charter purposes, but fiduciaries are free to amend the entity’s charter purposes

92. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT 3d § 3.04.
93. See Fishman, supra note 8, at 237 (explaining that directors must abide by the
organization’s governing documents).
94. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(E) (“[A] director shall consider the purposes
of the corporation . . . .”); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 n.17 (Del. 1991) (referring to “the
special duty of the fiduciaries of a charitable corporation to protect and advance its charitable
purpose”); id. at 472–73 (stating that fiduciaries of a charitable corporation “have a special duty to
advance its charitable goals”).
95. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5810–5817 (West 2013) (specifying procedures to amend
a charitable nonprofit’s articles of incorporation); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.105
(specifying procedures for amending the certificate of formation for a corporation with members
who have voting rights); id. § 22.106 (specifying procedures for amending the certificate of
formation for a corporation whose management is vested in its members); id. § 22.107 (specifying
procedures for amending the certificate of formation by the board of directors).
96. See Katz, supra note 8, at 696–97 (noting that the boards of charitable corporations have
broad authority to change the corporation’s purpose).
97. New York law is an exception. In New York, amendments to the purposes clause in a
charity’s corporate charter require judicial approval. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 804(a)(ii) (McKinney 2013) (requiring further that the state attorney general receive ten days’
written notice of an application for judicial approval of the charter amendment). Accordingly, New
York implements the static charter fidelity norm.
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in accordance with the procedures set forth by state laws governing
amendments.98 The comments to the PLNO state:
Some commentators place the obligation to obey the law and the
organizational documents and policies under a third duty unique to
charity fiduciaries—the ‘duty of obedience.’ Substantively, to these
commentators, such a duty embraces a faithfulness to the purposes of
the charity. These Principles, however, do not employ the
terminology of a duty of obedience. While the members of the
governing board must adhere to the organizational documents, they
also have the obligation to keep the purpose of the charity current and
useful. Accordingly, the board must amend the stated purposes when
necessary and appropriate to do so, in accordance with the law and the
existing organizational documents.99
The RMNCA and the MNCA Third likewise permit a nonprofit corporation
to amend its articles of incorporation by following certain procedures, without
needing to petition a court.100
3. What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Use of Assets Held Before and
After a Charter Amendment?
An issue that tests the bounds of obedience norms is whether a charity may
use assets held prior to a charter amendment—as well as substitutes or
replacements for those assets—to fulfill post-amendment purposes. A state law
prohibiting a charity from using its assets (and replacements thereof) held prior
to the charter amendment to advance post-amendment purposes implements the
static charter fidelity norm as to the management of pre-amendment funds and
their substitutes.101
a. The PLNO and Model Nonprofit Corporation Acts
Legal reform efforts have produced mixed results in offering guidance on this
issue. The PLNO features the greatest clarity, providing that, if charter purposes
are amended, general, unrestricted funds held by the charity may be used to
advance post-amendment purposes.102 The PLNO thereby embraces the
dynamic charter fidelity norm in this context.
Model nonprofit corporate statutes are less definitive. Under the 1987
RMNCA and the more recent MNCA 3rd ed., “obedience” to the corporate
98. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 300 cmt. g(3).
99. Id.
100. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 10.01–.31 (explaining the amendment
process and requirements); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 3d §§ 10.01–10.09 (same).
101. Even if the charity can formally amend its charter purposes without first receiving
governmental approval of the amendment, a state law that requires charity managers to employ
funds held prior to the charter amendment to fulfill pre-amendment purposes effectively embraces
the static charter fidelity norm as to the management of those assets.
102. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 245 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
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charter does not foreclose amendments to charter purposes.103 However, each
act does contemplate limitations on a corporation’s ability to redeploy funds
from their originally intended uses following an amendment of charter
purposes.104 The 1987 RMNCA states that a charter amendment does not affect
“any requirement or limitation imposed upon the corporation or any property
held by it by virtue of any trust upon which such property is held by the
corporation.”105 As discussed below, some courts characterize donated assets
held by a charitable corporation as funds impressed with a trust.106 The 1987
RMNCA does not explicitly state whether an otherwise unrestricted gift to a
charitable corporation is impressed with a charitable trust governed by its charter
purposes at the time of the gift,107 and the MNCA Third is arguably even more
ambiguous.108
b. Case Law Supporting the Static Charter Fidelity Norm
Contrary to the rule embraced by the PLNO, some cases implement the static
charter fidelity norm as applied to the post-amendment use of funds held before
and after a charter amendment. An illustrative case is In re Manhattan Eye, Ear
& Throat Hospital v. Spitzer, in which a charitable corporation operating an
acute care specialty teaching hospital proposed to sell its facility and use the
103. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 10.01–.31; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT 3d §§ 10.01–10.09.
104. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.08; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 3d
§ 10.09.
105. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.08. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5820(a) (West
1990) (“Amendment of the articles of a corporation, pursuant to this chapter, does not, of itself,
abrogate any requirement or limitation imposed upon the corporation, or any property held by it,
by virtue of the trust under which such property is held by the corporation.”).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 150–65. But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 28 cmt. a (2007) (stating that a gift to a charitable corporation for its general purposes does not
create a trust).
107. One commentator argues that the RMNCA “nowhere requires the use of general funds for
pre-amendment purposes only.” Katz, supra note 8, at 697. This reading of the RMNCA assumes
that charter purposes do not impress general corporate funds with a “trust” within the meaning of
section 10.08. Another commentator takes a contrary view of the RMNCA. See Iris J. Goodwin,
Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1093, 1135 (2005) (“Although some states may accord directors a measure of autonomy in
interpreting the charity’s mission, the commissioners who drafted the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act were ultimately uncomfortable with the idea of allowing a corporate charity to
alter its purposes without applying to court for cy pres relief. . . .”). The comments to the RMNCA
are
ambiguous.
See,
e.g.,
REVISED
MODEL
NONPROFIT
CORP.
ACT
§ 2.02 cmt. 3(a) (“By irrevocably dedicating assets when such dedication is not required, the
incorporators may inadvertently impress the assets of a corporation with unintended restrictions
and obligations.”); see also Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58 (“[T]he Act suggests the
possibility that the corporation, as distinct from the director, may continue to be subject to state
common law that applies trust rules to the property held by the nonprofit corporation.”) (citing
RMNCA § 8.30 cmt. 1).
108. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 210 (discussing whether the static charter fidelity norm
applies under the MNCA Third, and determining that the statute “punts on the issue”).
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proceeds to support free-standing diagnostic and treatment centers in poor
neighborhoods.109 Realizing that this course of action would require an
amendment to the hospital’s certificate of incorporation, the hospital’s
governing board authorized, but did not formally adopt, the required
amendment.110 The proposed sale of substantially all of the hospital’s assets
required judicial approval under state law.111 The relevant statute required the
hospital to establish that “the consideration and the terms of the [transaction] are
fair and reasonable to the corporation, and that the purposes of the corporation .
. . will be promoted thereby.”112
The court concluded that the charity failed to satisfy both prongs of the
statutory test.113 Under the first prong, the hospital’s board disregarded the value
of the hospital’s ongoing operations and its name.114 Under the second prong,
the board proposed “a fundamental change” and sought to devote corporate
assets to “a new and fundamentally different corporate purpose.”115
In prefacing its analysis of each statutory prong, the court embraced the duty
of obedience in no uncertain terms116 and interpreted the statute through the lens
of the duty of obedience.117 Recognizing that, under some circumstances, a
board may properly abandon “the organization’s mission by selling its assets and
then undertaking a new mission,”118 the court opined that one should direct
attention to “the duty of obedience, which mandates that a Board, in the first
instance, seek to preserve its original mission.”119 The court further explained
that initiating “a course of conduct which turns it away from the charity’s central
and well-understood mission should be a carefully chosen option of last
resort.”120 Otherwise, in the face of financial difficulties, a board might choose
to sell the nonprofit’s assets and modify its mission, “rather than taking all

109. 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
110. Id. at 584.
111. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a) (McKinney 2005).
112. Id. § 511(a)(6).
113. Manhattan Eye, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
114. Id. at 594.
115. Id. at 594–95.
116. See id. at 593 (“It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to
ensure that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has been referred to
as the ‘duty of obedience.’ It requires the director of a not-for-profit corporation to ‘be faithful to
the purposes and goals of the organization,’ since ‘[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate
objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives:
perpetuation of particular activities are central to the raison d’etre of the organization.’ . . . [T]he
duty of obedience, perforce, must inform the question of whether a proposed transaction to sell all
or substantially all of a charity’s assets promotes the purposes of the charitable corporation when
analyzed under section 511.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 595.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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reasonable efforts to preserve the mission which has been the object of its
stewardship.”121
Although Manhattan Eye certainly supports the static charter fidelity norm,
its usefulness in jurisdictions outside New York is questionable. Manhattan Eye
involved a transaction governed by a specific statutory section requiring judicial
approval of a charity’s plan to sell a substantial portion of its assets.122 The
statute expressly required the charity to establish that the terms of the proposed
sale would promote “the purposes of the corporation,”123 which may well refer
to its historic charter purposes.124 The court’s ode to a “duty of obedience” was
unnecessary, given this explicit statutory language.
Another case commanding scholarly attention125 is Attorney General v.
Hahnemann Hospital.126 In Hahnemann Hospital, a nonprofit charity operating
a hospital sought judicial blessing127 of its proposed sale of hospital assets and
its subsequent operation as a grant-making charity.128 The court in Hahnemann
Hospital applied the dynamic charter fidelity norm in one context and the static
charter fidelity norm in another. First, the court held that the corporate charity’s
board did not violate any fiduciary duty “merely by amending the articles of

121. Id. According to the court, the facts demonstrated that the hospital’s board had failed to
make “a reasoned and studied determination that there was a lack of need” for the hospital, “or that
the financial difficulties made it impossible to ensure the survival” of hospital operations. Id. The
court noted that it was clear that the desire to sell hospital assets drove the change in the charity’s
purposes. Id. at 596. Hence, the court determined that the hospital had not made “a showing that
the sale will promote the purposes of the corporation,” and declined to approve the sale. Id. at 597.
122. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a)(6) (McKinney 2005). However, other
state statutes do not even expressly require judicial approval of a sale of substantially all of a
charity’s assets. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.§ 22.252 (West 2012) (allowing the sale
of all of a corporation’s assets by a vote of its directors or members with voting rights).
123. N. Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a)(6).
124. The statutory prong requiring that a sale promote the purposes of the corporation would
add little to the law if the “purposes” are merely whatever the charity’s board chooses them to be
immediately prior to filing the petition.
125. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 14, at 81 n.159; Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1467
& n.310; Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing
the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 999 n.141 (2010).
126. 494 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 1986).
127. Because the charity and the intended purchaser of the hospital conditioned the sale upon
obtaining the approval of the Massachusetts Attorney General and a court, the court declined to
decide whether, in the acknowledged absence of a statutory provision on point, judicial approval
of the sale would be required. Id. at 1017. However, the court did state that the parties’ assumption
that judicial approval was required “may be correct.” Id.
128. Id. at 1013–14. The factual posture of the case is unusual, for the charitable nonprofit
corporation received a great deal of its funding from a charitable trust, the terms of the governing
instrument of which were incorporated by reference in the charitable corporation’s bylaws.
Nonetheless, the rationale of Hahnemann Hospital conceivably extends well beyond those facts.
Id.
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organization to provide for the possibility of a sale of all assets.”129 Thus, the
court applied the dynamic charter fidelity norm in the context of deciding
whether charter amendments may be formally adopted.
More interesting, though, is the court’s analysis of the effect of the
amendments to charter purposes on assets held before and after the amendment.
Two of the amendments were consistent with the terms of the governing
instrument of an affiliated charitable trust, whose terms were incorporated by
reference into the charitable corporation’s bylaws when the trust originally
funded the corporation.130 Because donors were on notice under the
corporation’s bylaws that its purposes could be expanded to include additional
purposes for which the affiliated trust was organized, and further because two
amendments to the charter conformed to trust purposes, the court found that
these amendments were consistent with the terms of trust,131 and thus,
presumably, pre-amendment donations could be devoted to further such
purposes.132 However, because the third amendment to charter purposes
(which broadly authorized the corporation to promote the health of the general
public) exceeded the purposes of the affiliated trust, the court held that the board
“will violate their fiduciary duties to those donors if they apply to the third, new
purpose any proceeds of the sale attributable to donations from
the . . . trust and from unrestricted donations made” before the amendment.133
Just as intriguing is the dicta with which the court concluded its opinion:
[W]e take this opportunity to comment on Hahnemann’s argument
that, because under . . . [state statutory law] it may amend its purposes
to include any charitable purpose, it may apply its unrestricted funds
to any charitable purpose which, by amendment, it includes in its
charter. Hahnemann’s reading of . . . [state statutory law] would, in
effect, grant to charitable corporations unfettered discretion to apply
funds to any charitable purpose. By simply amending its charter
purposes, a charitable corporation would itself be able to exercise the
power to devote funds to new charitable purposes whenever the
trustees decided to do so, without any requirement that the new
purposes be similar and not contradictory. The public could not be
assured that funds it donated would be used for similar public
charitable purposes. . . . Further, the corporation would be able to
evade dissolution by reconstituting itself and directing all funds to its
newly stated purposes. Such an interpretation also might eviscerate
the Attorney General’s power and responsibility to “enforce the due
129. Id. at 1018. The court also held that, in amending its corporate purposes to sell its historic
(i.e., hospital) assets and then become a grant-making institution, the charity’s board had not
violated a fiduciary duty to wind up its affairs in accordance with the state statute. Id. at 1019–20.
130. Id. at 1020–21.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1021.
133. Id.
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application of [charitable] funds . . . and prevent breaches of trust in
the administration thereof.”134
This cautionary dicta of Hahnemann Hospital strongly suggests that the court
broadly embraced the static charter fidelity norm as applied to the management
of assets held prior to a charter amendment—at least when there is no provision
in the governing instrument specifically notifying donors that their donations
can be used to advance amended purposes.
A third case of scholarly note is Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, which
concerned a nonprofit corporation (Queen) that had operated a hospital since its
formation in 1927.135 Five years later, it added a wing that housed a clinic, which
was later operated by an order of Franciscan sisters supervised by Queen’s
medical staff.136 In 1971, Queen’s board of directors approved a lease of the
hospital facilities (except for the outpatient clinic and a convent house) to a forprofit company.137 Queen proposed to devote a substantial portion of rental
receipts to establish and operate additional medical clinics for the poor.138
Opposing the deal, California’s Attorney General argued “that under its articles
of incorporation, Queen held its assets in trust primarily for the purpose of
operating a hospital, and the use of those assets exclusively for outpatient clinics
would constitute an abandonment of Queen’s primary charitable purpose and a
diversion of charitable trust assets.”139
The court embraced the rule that “all the assets of a corporation organized
solely for charitable purposes must be deemed to be impressed with a charitable
trust by virtue of the express declaration of the corporation’s purposes,”
notwithstanding that donors had not explicitly incorporated such purposes in gift
instruments.140 The court then focused on the precise language of the nonprofit’s
charter purposes. It observed that the articles of incorporation named the entity
as a “hospital” and that, although the articles referred to multiple purposes, “the
framework of those multiple purposes is the operation of a hospital.”141 In
summary, the court found that “[t]he articles of incorporation alone—without
resort to additional evidence—compel the inference that although Queen is
entitled to do many things besides operating a hospital, essential to all those

134. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
135. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1977).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 38–39.
138. Id. at 39.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Pacific Home v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953)).
141. Id. at 40. The articles of incorporation did not even mention clinics. Id. Moreover,
although a clause of the charter referred broadly to “acts of Christian charity particularly among
the sick and ailing,” the clause “conclude[d] with the conjunctive purpose, ‘to house and care’ for
persons, suggesting a hospital facility.” Id. Other clauses also implied or referred to the existence
of hospital operations. Id.
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other activities is the continued operation of a hospital.”142 In short, the court
held that although Queen could use some of its assets to further non-hospitalrelated purposes, it may not “cease to perform the primary purpose for which it
was organized.”143
Queen of Angels is consistent with older California cases144 that continue to
influence some judges in other jurisdictions.145 Whether these cases remain
controlling under California law has been questioned, insofar as they pre-date
the 1980 enactment of California’s nonprofit corporation act.146 However, the
California Attorney General continues to embrace the trust law analysis in these
cases,147 as do some attorneys general in other states.148
c. Case Law Supporting the Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm
Consistent with the PLNO, and contrary to the approach of Manhattan Eye,
Hahnemann Hospital, and Queen of Angels, some cases support or implicitly
embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied to a charity’s
post-amendment use of assets held prior to an amendment to its articles of
incorporation. For example, in Kansas East Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc. v. Bethany Medical Center, Inc., a Methodist conference of
churches (“the Conference”) sought a declaratory judgment and an order to
142. Id. The court then buttressed its reasoning by demonstrating that Queen had long operated
a hospital and had held itself out to the public (i.e., governmental authorities and donors) as doing
so. Id. at 40–41.
143. Id. at 41.
144. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 938–39 (Cal.
1964) (ruling that the complaint of the minority trustees of a charitable corporation stated a cause
of action by alleging that the majority trustees sought to abandon the corporation’s historic, charter
purpose to conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical college and to convert it into a school
teaching allopathic medicine and surgery); In re Los Angeles Cnty. Pioneer Soc., 257 P.2d 1, 6
(Cal. 1953) (quoting In re Clippinger’s Estate, 171 P.2d 567, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)) (“‘[A]
devise to a society organized for a charitable purpose without a declaration of the use to which the
gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the objects for which the organization was created.’”);
Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that funds
raised by a nonprofit corporation to benefit needy members of its controlling entity were “impressed
with a trust for the exclusive benefit” of those members notwithstanding subsequent charter
amendments).
145. See, e.g., Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 250 (S.D. 2003) (ruling that, if
South Dakota’s Attorney General can demonstrate that amendments to the corporate charter of a
hospital corporation’s predecessor affected nonmembers’ rights, “a constructive charitable trust
may be imposed on those assets donated to the local facilities”). The court noted that “[o]ther
courts have held that an amendment of a nonprofit corporation’s bylaws for the purpose of changing
the corporate purpose was an abuse of the charitable trust created in gifts given to the corporation
prior to the amendment.” Id. (citing Los Angeles Cnty. Pioneer Soc., 257 P.2d at
7–8).
146. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 66.
147. For a discussion of this point, see Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1468 & n.311.
148. See, e.g., John W. Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney
General, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 272–73 (2004).

2013]

Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and the Duty of Obedience

941

dissolve Bethany Medical Center, Inc. (“Bethany”) and distribute its assets to
the Conference.149 Bethany held approximately $40–45 million in cash after it
sold its hospital assets to a for-profit company.150 At the time of the litigation in
question, Bethany’s articles of incorporation permitted its board to amend them,
and stated that upon dissolution, Bethany’s net assets would be distributed to the
Conference.151 The lower court refused to order that Bethany be dissolved, but
it did issue a permanent injunction prohibiting Bethany from displacing the
Conference as the recipient of the assets if Bethany was dissolved.152
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the Conference’s argument that
charitable trust law, rather than the statutory language of the Kansas Corporation
Code, should control the disposition of the case.153 The court dismissed the
notion that the Conference functioned “as a trust settlor,” and emphatically
concluded that “dissolution of Bethany is governed by the corporate statutes.”154
Having rejected the application of trust law to the question of whether Bethany
must be dissolved, the court then addressed the trial court’s injunction against
amending Bethany’s articles so as to displace the Conference as the distributee
of Bethany’s assets in the event of Bethany’s dissolution.155 Bethany argued
that the court violated its due process rights by entering the injunction without
any notice or hearing on the issue.156 Bethany’s argument required proof that it
possessed a legally-protected interest which it could not be deprived of without
notice and an opportunity to be heard.157 The Kansas Supreme Court accepted
the argument that state nonprofit law created a property interest in Bethany,158
and then linked its analysis rejecting the application of trust law to the question
of the propriety of the lower court’s injunction.159 The court concluded that “the
district court interfered in the internal affairs of Bethany by enjoining it from

149. 969 P.2d 859, 860 (Kan. 1998).
150. Id. at 861.
151. Id. at 862.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 863.
154. Id. at 864.
155. Id. at 866–67.
156. Id. at 867.
157. See id. at 867 (noting that the due process rights of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
attach only to deprivation of life, liberty, or property).
158. Id. at 868.
159. See id. at 870 (“The resolution of Bethany’s cross-appeal [on the injunction] is affected
by our decision in the direct appeal by the Conference. We have approved the district court’s refusal
to dissolve Bethany, ruling that a corporation is a creation of statute and dissolution is controlled
by the Kansas Corporation Code. Notwithstanding that ruling, the district court proceeded to
control the future operation of Bethany by enjoining it from amending its articles of
incorporation.”).
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amending its articles of incorporation as to the distribution of its assets upon
dissolution.”160 Issuing the injunction, therefore, denied Bethany due process.161
Bethany Medical Center supports the dynamic charter fidelity norm in both
its rationale and holding. The case rejects the notion that charitable trust law
trumps state nonprofit statutes that confer power to a governing board to amend
an entity’s articles of incorporation and act accordingly.162 Although the court
considered the issue in the context of preserving the right of directors to amend
the entity’s dissolution clause (and thereby redirect the disposition of corporate
assets upon dissolution) the rationale of the case would also apply to the right of
directors to amend an entity’s purposes clause, and thereby redirect the use of
corporate assets in daily operations.163
Another case that broadly supports the dynamic charter fidelity norm is Dodge
v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Woman’s College.164 In this case, the plaintiffs
brought suit to enjoin the Randolph-Macon Woman’s College (“the College”),
a single-sex liberal arts college, from implementing its plan to become coeducational.165 The College sought to amend its articles of incorporation to
include men and women, and planned to sell assets, including its art collection,
to finance campus alterations that would facilitate the transition to a coeducational institution.166 The plaintiffs argued that the College is a charitable
trust under state law, and that the assets of the College are held in trust in
furtherance of the College’s charitable purposes as set forth in its articles of
incorporation, as they existed when the College received the assets as gifts.167
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cited a state statute characterizing the
assets of a charitable corporation as being held in trust.168
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 863 (holding that the dissolution of the corporation is controlled by the Kansas
Corporation Code, not charitable trust law).
163. The Kansas Supreme Court did not view this right of directors as unlimited, however.
The court approvingly cited Croon v. Tanner, 229 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Kan. 1951), for the proposition
that “only when the officers [of a corporation] are guilty of willful abuse of their
discretionary power or of bad faith, neglect of duty, perversion of the corporate purpose, or when
fraud or breach of trust are involved,” will courts interfere with the exercise of their judgment.
Bethany Med. Ctr., 969 P.2d at 870. Also noteworthy is that one of the lower court’s rulings, which
was not contested on appeal, required Bethany to use the proceeds from the sale of hospital assets
“to improv[e] the health of Wyandotte County citizens, particularly indigent ones.” Id. at 862.
Thus, the lower court fell short of fully embracing the dynamic charter fidelity norm. Because this
ruling was uncontested, however, the Kansas Supreme Court had no reason to address it.
164. 661 S.E.2d 805 (Va. 2008).
165. Id. at 806–07.
166. Id. at 807.
167. Id.
168. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507.1.A (2011) (“The assets of a charitable corporation
incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia shall be deemed to be held in trust for the public
for such purposes as are established by the governing documents of such charitable corporation,
the gift or bequest made to such charitable corporation, or other applicable law. The Attorney
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The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute
in question “requires the application of trust law, rather than corporate law, to
the College.”169 The Court explained that the plaintiffs’ theory “would
transform all charitable Virginia nonstock corporations into charitable trusts”
and would erroneously lead one to assume legislative intent to effect “a drastic
change in Virginia’s established law.”170 According to the court, the statute
“simply confers upon the Attorney General the authority to act on behalf of the
public to protect the public’s interest in assets held by charitable
corporations.”171 The statute does not, however, impose duties on charitable
corporations,172 hence, directors of charitable corporations are subject to the
same standards governing directors of all nonstock corporations under Virginia
statutory and common law.173
Dodge rejects the notion that a charitable corporation holds its assets in trust
in any comprehensive or far-reaching sense, as well as the idea that directors of
charitable corporations owe duties in addition to those owed generally by
directors of nonprofit corporations. Although the Virginia Supreme Court in
Dodge did not consider the plaintiffs’ argument that the lower court erred by
concluding that the doctrine of cy pres did not apply,174 the opinion’s rationale
is consistent with the lower court’s ruling.175 By emphasizing that state
nonprofit corporate law governs charitable corporations and their directors,
Dodge strongly suggests that directors have the power to amend the charter
purposes clauses of the corporations that they govern and deploy corporate
assets to pursue those purposes.176
Another case supporting the dynamic charter fidelity norm is City of Hughes
Springs v. Hughes Springs Volunteer Ambulance Service, in which a nonprofit
corporation, originally formed to operate an ambulance service, was impeded
from performing its primary historical purpose by local law enforcement and the
city council.177 The nonprofit corporation responded by amending its charter
purposes “to provide various services to the community which relate to the
General shall have the same authority to act on behalf of the public with respect to such assets as
he has with respect to assets held by unincorporated charitable trusts and other charitable entities,
including the authority to seek such judicial relief as may be necessary to protect the public interest
in such assets.”).
169. Dodge, 661 S.E.2d at 808.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 809.
172. Id. The court observed that section 2.2-507.1.B of the Virginia Code states that the
provision relied upon by the plaintiffs is not “intended to modify the standard of conduct applicable
under existing law to the directors of charitable corporations.” Id.
173. Id. The court observed that Virginia’s trust code does not apply to the College. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 807 (noting that the circuit court also held that the Uniform Trust Code was
inapplicable to the situation).
176. See id. at 808 (rejecting the contention that trust law applies to nonprofit corporations).
177. 223 S.W.3d 707, 711–12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
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health and safety of the citizens in the Hughes Springs area.”178 A member of
the nonprofit corporation and the City of Hughes Springs petitioned the court to
dissolve and liquidate the entity.179 They relied on a provision of the Texas
Nonprofit Corporation Act180 that required a court to liquidate a nonprofit
corporation if “the corporation is unable to carry out its purposes.”181
The court held that the amendments were valid.182 In view of the propriety of
the amended charter purposes, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not prove
that the nonprofit was no longer able to carry out its purpose.183 In fact, the court
held that the nonprofit “is able to carry out its purposes as amended.”184 In
reaching its decision, the court rebuffed the member’s attempt to buttress her
argument by claiming that the doctrine of cy pres required the liquidation of the
corporation under the statutory provision at issue.185 Although it was not well
explained in the opinion, the members apparently theorized that, because the
original purpose of the charitable nonprofit had failed, the court’s act of
liquidating the corporation under the authority of the statute would be consistent
with the doctrine of cy pres, insofar as dissolution could effectuate devotion of
corporate assets to a similar use.186 However, the court concluded that “[t]he
doctrine of cy pres does not prohibit the [nonprofit] from amending its purpose
or require the [nonprofit] to be dissolved.”187 Taking some license with the
scope of the doctrine, the court asserted that “even if the [nonprofit] is a charity,
its assets will be converted from one charitable purpose to another charitable
purpose—consistent with the doctrine of cy pres.”188
Although the Hughes Springs court could have better expressed the cy pres
argument, the important point is that the court refused to apply trust law concepts
to override the ability of a board of directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation
to amend its articles in accordance with state statutory law and then use its assets
to further post-amendment purposes. The opinion rejects the static charter
fidelity norm as applied to the use of corporate assets following an amendment
to a charitable corporation’s purposes clause.

178. Id. at 714.
179. Id. at 709.
180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-7.06 (West 2003). The statute has since been
amended and no longer exists. Hughes Springs, 223 S.W.3d at 710 n.2.
181. Hughes Springs, 223 S.W.2d at 709–10 (quoting TEX. REV. CRIM. STAT. ANN. Art. 13967.06 (West 2003) (repealed 2010)).
182. Id. at 715.
183. Id. at 716.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 715–16.
186. Under the nonprofit corporation’s original articles of incorporation, the City of Hughes
Springs was the designated distributee of assets upon dissolution of the corporation. Id. at 711.
187. Id. at 716.
188. Id.
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4. What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Distribution of Assets in
Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charitable Nonprofit Corporation?
A related issue is whether a charity desiring to terminate its existence may,
pursuant to a plan of dissolution, transfer its assets to a charity with purposes
dissimilar to those expressed in its charter. Some state statutes require
dissolving charities to distribute assets to organizations having charitable
purposes similar to those of the dissolving entity.189 Other statutes provide
simply that the corporation must distribute its assets to other tax-exempt
charities or governmental bodies.190 If the state statute governing distributions
in dissolution expressly requires the dissolving entity to transfer assets to other
charities with purposes similar to the longstanding express purposes of the
dissolving entity, the statute functionally embraces the static charter fidelity
norm, at least in part. If the state statute does not explicitly require a dissolving
entity to distribute assets only to a charitable transferee with specific purposes
similar to those of the transferor, a court may be asked to decide whether to
employ common law trust concepts to compel such a result.191
Blocker v. State illustrates this issue.192 In Blocker, the court held that the
directors of a charitable corporation breached their fiduciary duties by
attempting to distribute corporate assets in dissolution to a private estate in
which several directors had a personal interest.193 Although the holding itself is
unremarkable, its rationale is potentially far-reaching. The court accepted the
state’s argument that the charter of a charitable corporation constitutes a
declaration of charitable trust.194 The court held that property transferred to a
charitable corporation is “subject to implicit charitable or educational limitations
defined by the donee’s organizational purpose and within the meaning of the
statute, where no express limitation to the contrary is stated in the transfer.”195
According to the court, property that could be traced to such assets was likewise
held by the charity “subject to the limitations imposed on the corporation by the
terms of its own articles of incorporation.”196 Under this theory, the court

189. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-1403(b)(3) (2003) (requiring the assets to be transferred
to an organization “engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving
corporation”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1002-a(c)(1) (McKinney 2013) (same).
190. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.304(a)(2) (West 2012) (providing that the
remaining assets of a nonprofit corporation be distributed to other tax-exempt organizations, unless
the corporation’s certificate of formation has an alternate provision).
191. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 16, at 184–85 (explaining that, while some
states have codified the cy pres principles, other states still allow common law to govern whether
or not cy pres applies).
192. 718 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
193. Id. at 415.
194. Id. at 416.
195. Id. at 415.
196. Id.; see also id. (“We hold that the real property and personalty were assets received and
held by the corporation, whether from donation or purchase, subject to limitations permitting their
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concluded that distributions in liquidation were governed by a statutory
dissolution provision applicable to “[a]ssets received and held by the corporation
subject to limitations permitting their use only for charitable, religious,
eleemosynary, benevolent, educational or similar purposes.”197 The provision
generally required a dissolving nonprofit corporation to transfer such assets upon
dissolution to organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to those
in which the dissolving entity had engaged.198
Because the court in Blocker construed a statutory provision that has since
been repealed, one could argue that the “statutory duty” that the provision
created has vanished, and never even existed in other states with liberal
provisions governing distributions in liquidation of a charitable nonprofit
corporation. However, Blocker conceptualized donations received by a
corporation as restricted gifts in trust, restricted for the purposes of the donee at
the time of the donation.199 Just as assets restricted by the terms of a gift
instrument must be distributed in a manner consistent with the restriction when
the donee dissolves, so might a court influenced by Blocker conclude that assets
restricted by the terms of the donee’s charter (at the time of the donation) must
be similarly distributed upon the donee’s dissolution, even if state statutory law
permits distributions to any charitable corporation. The question essentially
requires a court to choose between the static charter fidelity norm and the
dynamic charter fidelity norm. Case law exists that supports each conflicting
view.200
C. Mission Fidelity Norms
There is less precedent that directly and clearly articulates the mission fidelity
norms. Mission fidelity norms have received at least modest judicial
recognition, although it is difficult to discern their impact apart from charter
fidelity norms. The two types of norms are theoretically distinct because a
charity’s mission (for example, operating an elementary school) may be more
use only for educational purposes, by reference to the stated purposes set forth in the articles of
incorporation.”).
197. Id. at 412, 415 (quoting the then-existing Article 1396-6.02.A(3) of the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act, which has since been repealed).
198. See id. (quoting Article 1396-6.02(a)(3) of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, which
has since been repealed) (“Assets received and held by the corporation subject to limitations [on
their use] . . . shall be transferred or conveyed to one or more domestic . . . corporations
. . . engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation.”).
199. See id. at 415 (“We further hold that the acceptance of [assets held by the corporation
from donations] established a charitable trust for the declared purposes as effectively as though the
assets had been accepted subject to an express limitation providing that the gift was held in trust
solely for such charitable purposes.”).
200. At least one case decided after Blocker v. State undermines the application of trust law
principles to Texas nonprofit corporations. See City of Hughes Springs v. Hughes Springs
Volunteer Ambulance Serv., Inc., 223 S.W.3d 707, 715–16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to apply
the trust law principle of cy pres to a nonprofit corporation in Texas).
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specific than the purposes expressly articulated in the charity’s corporate charter
(for example, advancing charitable and educational purposes).
1. Support for the Historic Mission Fidelity Norm
A few cases arguably embrace the historic mission fidelity norm, most notably
in cases where a board seeks to devote funds to purposes that deviate from an
entity’s longstanding mission.201 For example, in Manhattan Eye, it was
“axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure that the
mission of the charitable corporation is carried out.”202 Further, the court opined
that deviating “from the charity’s central and well-understood mission should be
a carefully chosen option of last resort.”203 Taken at face value, these statements
reflect adoption of the historic mission fidelity norm. However, it is unclear
whether the court assigned significance to the historic mission fidelity norm
apart from the static charter fidelity norm. In Manhattan Eye, the purposes
clause of the charity’s articles of incorporation articulated its specific mission, a
fact that did not escape the attention of the court.204
Queen of Angels offers additional judicial support for historicm ission fidelity.
After stating that the hospital’s articles of incorporation alone were sufficient to
impress donations with a charitable trust, the court buttressed its conclusion with
the observation that Queen had actually operated a hospital throughout its

201. In addition to the case law discussed in the text, some state statutes advance, or at least
tend to favor, the historic mission fidelity norm in the way that they regulate charitable hospital
conversions. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(e) (West 2013) (listing as one of the factors that
the Attorney General should consider in giving (or withholding) consent to a proposed hospital
conversion whether “[t]he proposed use of the proceeds from the agreement or transaction is
consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility”); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-7-406(9) (2012) (requiring that the state-mandated public hearing conducted by the
Attorney General in connection with the acquisition of a nonprofit hospital address several factors,
including “[w]hether any disposition proceeds will be used for appropriate charitable health care
purposes consistent with the nonprofit corporation’s original purpose or for the support and
promotion of health care in the affected community”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71
-20, 108(8) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that the Attorney General will approve the acquisition of a
nonprofit hospital if doing so is in the public interest; the Attorney General should consider, among
other factors, whether proceeds of the transaction are “used for appropriate charitable health care
purposes consistent with the seller’s original purpose or for the support and promotion of health
care in the affected community”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(c)(16) (2012) (requiring the
Attorney General to review a proposed nonprofit hospital conversion and consider, among other
factors, “[w]hether the proposed conversion results in an abandonment of the original purposes of
the existing hospital or whether a resulting entity will depart from the traditional purposes and
mission of the existing hospital such that a cy pres proceeding would be necessary”). See generally
Frost, supra note 8, at 953–57 (summarizing state laws governing charitable hospital conversions
and stating that the statutes generally require a showing “that the proceeds will be applied to a
charitable purpose that is generally consistent with the founder’s or donor’s intent”).
202. In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct.
1999).
203. Id. at 595.
204. See id. (referring to the charity’s “mission, as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation”).
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history, represented to governmental taxing authorities that it was a hospital, and
solicited public donations for hospital purposes.205 The court concluded that
Queen “was intended to and did operate a hospital and cannot, consistent with
the trust imposed upon it, abandon the operation of the hospital business in favor
of clinics.”206 Although this portion of the opinion was dictum, it reflects
judicial acceptance of the historic mission fidelity norm as applied to the use of
funds received and accumulated while the nonprofit was carrying out its
traditional mission.
2. Support for the Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm
Not all cases support rigid adherence to a charitable corporation’s historic
mission, however. For example, Bethany Medical Center tends to reject the
historic mission fidelity norm. In Bethany Medical Center, the Conference
argued that Bethany should be dissolved under state law because it had
“contracted away its purpose” by selling hospital assets.207 The Kansas Supreme
Court disagreed, reasoning that the sale did not devoid Bethany of purpose
because operating a hospital was “only one of several health-care related
purposes pursued by Bethany.”208
Similarly, the court in Hughes Springs held that the doctrine of cy pres did not
prohibit a nonprofit corporation originally formed to operate an ambulance
service from amending its purposes so as “to provide various services to the
community which relate to the health and safety of the citizens in the Hughes
Springs area.”209 The court also refused to order dissolution of the corporation,
for it was perfectly capable of fulfilling its amended purposes.210 By endorsing
the legitimacy of the corporation’s use of assets to further its amended charter
purposes, the court rejected both the static charter fidelity norm and the historic
mission fidelity norm.
Although these cases reject the historic mission fidelity norm, they do not
necessarily embrace the dynamic mission fidelity norm. Affirming the dynamic
mission fidelity norm not only imposes an affirmative obligation to advance the
charity’s specific mission upon charity fiduciaries, but also allows the governing

205. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1977).
206. Id. at 41. Cf. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 938 (Cal.
1964) (“Plaintiffs allege that defendant trustees threaten to divert the assets of COPS to purposes
other than those for which it was organized and for which COPS has in the past solicited and
received funds in trust.”).
207. Kan. E. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Bethany Med. Ctr., Inc., 969
P.2d 859, 864 (Kan. 1998).
208. Id. at 866.
209. City of Hughes Springs v. Hughes Springs Volunteer Ambulance Serv., 223 S.W.3d 707,
714, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
210. Id. at 714.
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board to amend the mission.211 Some language in case law tends to support this
approach,212 but it is unclear whether existing authorities actually impose an
obligation on charity fiduciaries to advance a charitable mission that is more
specific than its charter purpose. Insofar as the PLNO recognizes both the utility
of adopting mission statements and the need to evaluate grounds for altering a
charity’s mission over time, it at least partially embraces the dynamic mission
fidelity norm.213
D. The Charity Advancement Norm
State law consistently supports the elementary charity advancement norm and
its negative corollary. That it does so follows from the fundamental nature of
charitable nonprofit corporations and the statutes authorizing them. Directors of
a charitable nonprofit corporation must govern in a way that promotes
compliance with the corporation’s charter.214 Accordingly, a nonprofit
corporation organized for charitable purposes must advance “charitable,” as
opposed to non-charitable, purposes.
Certainly, the typical nonprofit
corporation statute authorizes a nonprofit corporation to have purposes broader
than those that the law recognizes as “charitable.”215 However, because
corporations organized for charitable purposes are typically incorporated under
nonprofit corporation statutes that require compliance with charter purposes, it
is accurate to state that a charity’s compliance with its charter requires that it
serve a charitable purpose. Thus, the essential structure of the statutory law of
nonprofit charitable corporations is designed to promote the charity
advancement norm and its negative corollary.
E. Summary
State case law and statutes governing directors of nonprofit corporations
clearly embrace the legality norm and the charity advancement norm, together
with its negative corollary. The status of other obedience norms governing
charity fiduciaries varies among the states.

211. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 8, at 904–05 (proposing a legal requirement that directors
advance a charity’s mission, but arguing for a flexible requirement that allows directors to amend
a charity’s purpose).
212. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468–69 n.17 (Del. 1991) (noting the director’s
duty to promote a charity’s mission and the Attorney General’s ability to challenge a board decision
that is in direct conflict with a charity’s mission).
213. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 320(b) cmt. e. (recognizing
the importance of developing a clear mission statement, but explaining that the board should be
able to alter the mission statement when needed).
214. See supra Part III.B.1.
215. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5301(a) (West 1995) (allowing for the creation of a
nonprofit corporation, and providing a non-exhaustive list of examples); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
ANN. § 22.051 (West 2012) (permitting the creation of a nonprofit corporation “for any lawful
purpose”).
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State laws embrace norms of charter fidelity, but they differ in whether they
impose the static charter fidelity norm or the dynamic charter fidelity norm.
Most states adopt the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied solely to the
formal ability of a governing board to amend the charity’s governing instrument.
But in other contexts, in which the question involves the freedom of directors to
direct corporate assets to uses that differ from historic corporate purposes, the
states take drastically different approaches. Some states rely on trust law
principles and impose the static charter fidelity norm on directors, whereas
others apply corporate law concepts broadly and hold directors to the dynamic
charter fidelity norm. In one state, different courts have embraced different
norms.
Whether states impose some form of the mission fidelity norm that is
independent of a charter fidelity norm is debatable. Some authorities appear to
embrace the historic mission fidelity norm, but do so in contexts in which the
norm largely coincides with the static charter fidelity norm. Other judicial
authorities reject the historic mission fidelity norm, but fall short of clearly
embracing the dynamic mission fidelity norm.
Reform efforts have not resolved the states’ differing approaches. The
RMNCA and the MNCA Third do not wrestle with the difficult issues raised by
the choice of obedience norms. The PLNO embraces the dynamic charter
fidelity norm and offers some support for the dynamic mission fidelity norm.
States have yet to look to the PLNO for guidance on these issues, however.
This survey of the law of obedience norms governing charity fiduciaries
suggests the importance of identifying the precise purposes that obedience
norms serve. Before one can determine “what” obedience norms should govern,
one must ponder “why” we need them.
IV. THE PURPOSE OF OBEDIENCE NORMS
The major justifications for obedience norms can be categorized as follows:
(1) ensuring the presence of public benefit,216 (2) promoting equity,217 and
(3) encouraging efficiency.218
A. Public Benefit
Ensuring that charitable organizations benefit the public is the most basic
purpose of obedience norms.219 In fact, the law defines a “charitable purpose”
216. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 214 (noting that a “public benefit” is the “fundamental
purpose” of obedience norms).
217. See id. at 215–16 (explaining that equity is another purpose of obedience norms).
218. See id. at 217–19 (suggesting that reliance-based and experience-based efficiency could
also be purposes of obedience norms).
219. Id. at 214; cf. Fremont-Smith & Lever, supra note 8, at 717 (“[T]here is great merit in the
common law regulatory scheme under which the state does not dictate the actions of fiduciaries,
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as one that is beneficial to the public.220 To require fiduciaries to advance
“charitable” purposes is therefore an attempt to promote public benefit. Of
course, requiring fiduciaries to advance charitable purposes (and not others) is
the essence of the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary.
Additionally, the legality norm generally complements the charity advancement
norm by discouraging behavior deemed detrimental to the public. Thus, the
public benefit justification for obedience norms supports adoption of the charity
advancement norm and its negative corollary, and supports imposition of the
legality norm as well.
A more difficult question is whether the public benefit justification supports
the adoption of additional obedience norms. Charter fidelity norms reinforce the
charity advancement norm by reminding fiduciaries of the activities that they
can and cannot cause their charities to undertake. Although the charity
advancement norm may be sufficient in theory to ensure that a charity produces
public benefit,221 some form of charter fidelity norm is useful in prompting
charity fiduciaries to adhere to the charity advancement norm. A similar
argument can be made in favor of the mission fidelity norm, because requiring
governance in accordance with a mission focuses attention on advancing charity
thoughtfully. The dynamic fidelity norms would serve these functions just as
well as the static norms, however.
Indeed, it is doubtful that the public benefit justification requires adoption of
any “static” obedience norm (static charter fidelity or historic mission fidelity).
Substantive government approval of an entity’s choice of charitable purpose and
mission is generally not required upon formation of a charitable entity.222 A
plausible explanation for this reality is that the law recognizes that the choice of
charitable purpose by private actors suffices to promote public benefit if it is
assumed that pursuing any charitable purpose produces public benefit. Why,
then, should substantive, ex ante governmental approval be necessary to ensure
the presence of public benefit when an entity’s governing board decides to alter
charitable purpose or mission? One can articulate (questionable) justifications
grounded in equity and efficiency for such approval, but ensuring the presence
of some public benefit does not seem a persuasive justification for either static
norm.
but rather monitors them to assure continued dedication to public purposes.”); Sugin, supra note 8,
at 913–18 (discussing the public interest in a charity’s fulfillment of its mission and discrediting a
donor-centric approach to evaluating nonprofit fiduciary duties).
220. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(f) (2003) (stating that charitable trust
purposes include “other purposes that are beneficial to the community”); id. cmt. a (“The common
element of charitable purposes is that they are designed to accomplish objects that are beneficial to
the community—i.e., to the public or indefinite members thereof—without also serving what
amount to private trust purposes . . . .”).
221. Such sufficiency obviously depends upon whether pursuing the purposes that the law
recognizes as “charitable” does, in fact, produce public benefit.
222. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 1.25(a) (3d ed. 2009) (stating that the
Secretary of State is required to file articles of incorporation that conform to law).
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B. Equity
Another possible justification for obedience norms is that they promote equity
by protecting the reliance interests of donors, and perhaps other stakeholders.223
The theory is that donors have donated funds to charitable entities under the
assumption that the money will be used to perform the donee’s charitable
purposes as they exist when the funds are received.224 To allow the charity to
alter its purposes, or perhaps even mission, after receiving such donations is
unfair to those donors because of their reliance on the then-existing
purposes/mission of the donee. This rationale appears to be a favorite of the
courts and commentators embracing static obedience norms.225 However, the
equity rationale has limited appeal in the case of charitable trusts, and
considerably less persuasive force as applied to charitable nonprofit
corporations. Further, the reliance-based equity justification does not support
all obedience norms equally, even in the case of charitable trusts.
Because of long-standing legal deference to the terms of trusts in general226
and the application of the doctrine of cy pres to charitable trusts,227 those who
currently contribute to charitable trusts properly assume that the trust’s express
charitable purposes will typically remain unchanged. But this general
observation justifies upholding donors’ reliance interests on equity grounds only
for as long as the law continues to apply cy pres or some similar doctrine. Were
the law to change, those who subsequently donate to charitable trusts would lack
a compelling reliance interest in static charter fidelity.228 Further, even under
current law, those who donate to charitable trusts properly assume that the static
charter fidelity norm applies only when the terms of trust do not authorize
amendments by the trustees. If the terms of trust provide a mechanism for the
trustees to amend the trust terms without judicial proceedings, those terms

223. Buckles, supra note 20, at 215.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hospital, 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (noting
that, if the charity could freely amend its charter purpose, “[t]he public could not be assured that
funds it donated would be used for similar public charitable purposes”); Queen of Angels Hosp. v.
Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that Queen was bound to its purpose
of operating a hospital because, among other reasons, it had solicited donations from the public for
the hospital); Frost, supra note 8, at 944–45, 951 (arguing that donors would be unlikely to give
without assurance that the funds would be used to further corporate purposes).
226. See supra Part II.A.1.
227. The general inability to amend the purposes of a charitable trust absent cy pres
proceedings is longstanding. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003). For
a discussion of cy pres, see supra Part II.B.2.
228. Were the law to change, donors to charitable trusts would not have grounds for relying on
defunct doctrine. It is circular to argue that equity concerns justify continued imposition of the
static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts merely because
(1) donors assume the existence of the static charter fidelity norm; and (2) they do so because the
law imposes it.
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control.229 A donor who gives to a charitable trust that permits amendments to
its purposes clause therefore has no strong reliance interest in the fixed terms of
trust.230
Moreover, even in the case of a charitable trust that does not provide for
amendments by trustees, trust law does not support adoption of the historic
mission fidelity norm. The classic expression of the duty to obey terms of trust
that the law imposes on trustees applies only with respect to the actual terms of
trust. An action in cy pres is necessary to alter charitable purposes only when
administering the terms of trust becomes impossible, illegal, impracticable, or
wasteful.231 The classic articulation of cy pres does not require trustees of
charitable trusts to go to court to bless a new charitable mission that falls within
the express charitable purposes of the trust.232 Hence, donors to a charitable trust
have no strong reliance interest in any particular charitable mission of a trust
when other charitable missions would also further express the trust’s purposes.
Reliance-based equity offers an even less compelling justification for static
obedience norms in the case of charitable corporations. Nonprofit corporation
statutes typically enable charter amendments without court approval,233
immediately distinguishing them from charitable trusts, which are governed by
default rules requiring court approval of amendments to a trust instrument.234
Donors to charitable nonprofit corporations are on notice of these corporate
laws. It is plausible that the average donor would assume that static obedience
norms do not govern directors of charitable nonprofit corporations, perhaps even
as applied to their power to deploy existing assets to advance new charitable
purposes.235 If donors do assume such flexibility, rejection of static obedience
norms does not defeat their reliance interests.
Moreover, if the law across the states consistently assumed contrary donor
expectations, counsel to nonprofit charitable corporations could draft governing

229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(1) (2003) (“[T]he trustee or beneficiaries of
a trust have only such power to terminate the trust or to change its terms as is granted by the terms
of the trust.”).
230. The sole “donor” of many charitable trusts is simply its settlor. However, a founder who
contemplates large scale future public support may still choose the charitable trust form of operating
a charity. Such a charity would have multiple donors.
231. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. SCOTT, supra note 89 (describing how difficult it can be for a court, in the context of
charitable trusts, to apply cy pres to determine the alternate disposition a settlor would want); see
also supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 77-79, 89 and accompanying text.
235. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 216 (“Because of these typically liberal statutory
amendment procedures, and absent specific statutory directives to the contrary, donors may assume
that a charitable corporation can use gifts unaccompanied by any explicit donor-imposed restriction
or explicit charity-imposed limitations for any bona fide ‘charitable’ purpose.”)(footnote omitted));
cf. Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1418 n.76 (observing that “a corporate charity might more
easily change its purposes than a charitable trust”).
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documents to undermine the basis for maintaining the assumption.236 Lawyers
could draft broadly phrased purposes clauses in corporate charters so as to limit
the constraining effect of the static charter fidelity norm. They could also draft
charter provisions explicitly stating that directors can deploy existing assets to
advance newly amended charitable purposes. Under these circumstances,
donors presumed to be aware of these provisions would have no legitimate basis
for believing that their donations will be used to further any particular charitable
purpose or mission. All of these charter provisions should be enforceable,237
which would undermine the reliance-based equity argument used to justify static
obedience norms.
Furthermore, adopting the historic mission fidelity norm as applied to
directors of nonprofit charitable corporations would be doctrinally suspect. The
historic mission fidelity norm traditionally has not been imposed on trustees of
charitable trusts independently of the static charter fidelity norm.238 Declining
to shackle trustees of charitable trusts with this norm while at the same time
imposing it on directors of nonprofit corporations (who oversee a form of entity
that, if anything, is usually thought to avoid some of the rigidities of the law of
charitable trusts) creates incoherence.239 A possible response to this line of
reasoning is that a single settlor of a charitable trust has only herself to blame
for failing to articulate a precise charitable mission, whereas the multitudinous
donors to a charitable corporation operating perpetually have no ability to draft
charter purposes. But this objection is largely illusory. Rejecting the static
charter fidelity norm and the historic mission fidelity norm in the case of
charitable nonprofit corporations does not leave donors without protections
analogous to those enjoyed by the settlor of a charitable trust. Donors of
charitable corporations are still free to protect their donations from diversion to
an alternative charitable use in the future by explicitly restricting their gifts when

236. Granted, funding realities may constrain this strategic behavior to some degree. If a
charity anticipated that drafting its corporate charter to maximize its flexibility in redeploying
donations would dramatically curtail its current receipt of donations, it would likely exercise
self-restraint in drafting charter terms. See Gary, Trust Law, supra note 8, at 616 (“As a practical
matter, to be able to attract future gifts from the same donors or from other donors, the charity must
not stray far from its mission and must manage its assets effectively.”).
237. Cf. Denckla v. Indep. Found., 181 A.2d 78, 83 (Del. Ch. 1962) (“If the power to make the
contested grant is either expressly or by necessary implication given by its charter then it matters
not whether trust law or corporate law is applicable.”), aff’d, 193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963).
238. See supra Part I.D. (“[A] state that has adopted the static charter fidelity norm need not
necessarily adopt the historic mission fidelity norm.”).
239. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58–59 (“That corporate law governs directors’
fiduciary duties, but trust law would govern their power to manage charitable assets, makes little
sense doctrinally or analytically.”).
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made.240 The law generally honors such restrictions.241 Consequently, donors
who wish to bind charitable donees to fulfill their expectations can do so.
Additionally, rejecting the static obedience norms in the case of charitable
corporations does not disregard donor expectations altogether. It is possible to
disfavor a system requiring ex ante, substantive governmental approval of a
change in a charitable corporation’s purpose or mission while embracing a
system that provides for meaningful ex post judicial review of fiduciary
decisions to change purposes or mission. A variety of approaches short of ex
ante, substantive governmental approval would balance the reliance interest of
donors and the desirability of vesting in nonprofit directors the primary
responsibility for altering a charitable corporation’s course.242
Finally, the basic charity advancement norm and its negative corollary protect
the most compelling reliance interest of donors and other stakeholders.
Although it is debatable whether a charitable corporation’s donors should
assume that the donee will not unilaterally alter its charitable purposes or
mission, donors surely are entitled to assume that the donee will not divert funds
to a non-charitable purpose. Such diversion would plainly violate donors’
expectations.
Fiduciaries who comply with the fundamental charity
advancement norm and its negative corollary honor this reasonable expectation
of donors. Thus, once again, rejecting static obedience norms does not require
rejecting all reliance interests of donors.
C. Efficiency
One may also attempt to justify obedience norms on grounds of efficiency.243
The charity advancement norm is limited in the degree to which it promotes
efficiency because compliance with the norm merely means that fiduciaries are
furthering some charitable purpose, not that they are doing so effectively.244
240. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 898 (noting that those administering charities must administer
their assets consistent with the donor’s stated wishes); see also Marion R.
Fremond-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal
Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 620–22 (2007) (discussing
donors’ rights to enforce the terms of restricted gifts made to corporate charities).
241. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 914 (“Without additional legal protections, donors have
tremendous power under contract law [to protect their interests], as they define the terms of their
gifts.”).
242. See infra Part V (discussing several approaches).
243. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–19. I previously articulated two versions of the
efficiency argument: reliance-based efficiency and experience-based efficiency. Because the latter
version is quite weak for reasons already explained, I focus on the former version of the argument
in this Article. For a discussion (and rejection) of the possible efficiencies of trust law parallelism
in the context of unrestricted charitable gifts to corporate charities, see Katz, supra note 8, at 717–
18.
244. This explains why the public benefit justification for obedience norms is distinct from the
efficiency justification. To claim that furthering charitable purposes produces a public benefit does
not imply that advancing the precise charitable purposes in question maximizes public benefit. This
Article characterizes justifications for obedience norms that are articulated in terms of maximizing
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Charter fidelity norms may promote efficiency by educating and reminding
charity fiduciaries to adhere to the charity advancement norm and its negative
corollary. Moreover, requiring some form of mission fidelity is also likely to
be efficient, insofar as requiring governance in accordance with the charity’s
mission encourages fiduciaries to deliberate and weigh possible goals and
achievable outcomes, rather than merely supervise random acts of kindness.245
However, the dynamic charter and mission fidelity norms would serve these
functions just as well as the static norms. Furthermore, there are valid reasons
to believe that static obedience norms, on balance, are probably less efficient
than dynamic norms in the case of charitable corporations.246
Short-term efficiency is better served by imposing dynamic norms in some
contexts.247 To illustrate, consider a cash-rich charity organized to fund the
neutering of stray cats in Louisiana cities. Assume a hurricane blasts through
the Gulf of Mexico and leaves thousands homeless in New Orleans. The social
welfare produced by helping homeless human hurricane victims surely
outweighs that of neutering the (now drastically diminished) feline population.
However, the static charter fidelity norm and the historic mission fidelity norm
would limit the charity’s ability to quickly alleviate widespread human suffering
because of the inevitable delay caused by the requirement mandating that the
charity obtain ex ante government approval of the change in charitable
purpose.248
The efficiency of requiring ex ante substantive governmental approval of
changes in charter purpose and mission that are less time sensitive depends on
many factors, including the out-of-pocket costs of such a system, the relative
competence of charity fiduciaries and government agents in exercising
judgment, and the long-term effect of the choice of the system on charitable
donations.249
The costs associated with the first factor, out-of-pocket costs of obtaining ex
ante substantive governmental approval to change the charter purpose or
mission, are likely higher than the costs of a system that does not require such
public benefit, or at least better enhancing public benefit than other norms, net of associated costs,
as justifications grounded in efficiency.
245. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 84 (stating that “mission factors may help give
content to the inchoate considerations that contribute to the board’s deliberation”); Sugin, supra
note 8, at 921 (“This is how care and obedience come together—the board must exercise care in
evaluating the charitable goals and effectiveness of the organization.”).
246. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217.
247. Cf. Atkinson, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing that freeing fiduciaries from the obligation to
advance purposes favored by “dead donors” enables them to “respond to evolving social needs in
a more efficient and creative fashion”); Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 8, at 960 (“Blind
obedience to mission . . . can impede the rational use of nonprofit corporate assets.”).
248. Even adoption of the dynamic charter fidelity norm would delay the charity’s response
time to a lesser degree.
249. For a preliminary assessment of the argument that efficiency is enhanced when donors
can rely upon static fidelity norms, see Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–18.
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approval. Government actors will likely review fewer changes in a system that
does not require ex ante substantive government approval.250
No credible
argument can be made that requiring a governmental actor to review and
evaluate every change in charter purpose or mission by every charity is cheap.
Furthermore, other costs must be considered. For example, nonprofits seeking
to alter their charitable paths will incur advocacy costs.
Concerning the second factor, there is no readily apparent reason to assume
that charity fiduciaries are less able than government actors to decide upon the
advisability of a change in purpose or mission. First, government approval of
an entity’s choice of charitable purpose and mission is generally not required
when forming a charitable entity or drafting its initial mission statement. If the
law assumes that private actors can be entrusted with the choice of an entity’s
original charitable purpose and mission, why should the law not assume likewise
when fiduciaries decide upon a new charitable direction? In addition, the law
generally assumes that charity fiduciaries are competent to make decisions. A
governing board is not usually required to seek advance state approval to enlarge
its facilities, double its workforce, expand its customer base, relocate, obtain a
loan, or radically alter its investment portfolio.251 If fiduciaries are assumed to
be capable of making these changes, why should the law not assume that they
are also capable of deciding upon changes in purpose and mission? Third, it
may be assumed that those most familiar with the past and present operations of
a charity are in the best position to evaluate the merits of a change in the charity’s
direction. Indeed, the ability of a board to manage a charity largely free from
governmental meddling is a hallmark of the nonprofit sector.252 If a governing
board keeps itself informed as required by the duty of care,253 the board is
probably at least as familiar with its operations as is a government actor, whose
knowledge of the entity may be short-lived and limited to the contents of a file
that is but one of hundreds the actor is responsible for reviewing.254 Further,
250. There is a plausible system of ex post review of charter and mission changes by
government actors that is just as comprehensive and costly as one requiring ex ante review of such
changes. However, such attributes of a system providing for ex post review of fiduciary decisions
seem improbable. In a system requiring ex ante approval, every change in the purposes or mission
of every charity theoretically requires governmental review and an assessment of its merits. In a
system of ex post review, a governmental actor, such as a state attorney general, would be expected
to focus attention on changes in purpose or mission that seem most problematic.
251. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5210 (West 2013) (stating that all powers of a nonprofit
corporation must be “exercised by or under the direction of the board [of directors]”); TEX BUS.
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.201 (West 2012) (stating that the board of directors manages a nonprofit
corporation’s affairs).
252. Fremont-Smith, supra note 16, at 1–2. Cf. Reiser, supra note 47, at 14 (“[R]eliance on
public enforcement of charitable mission would seriously threaten charitable autonomy and perhaps
infringe on associational rights.”).
253. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 8.30(a) cmt. 2 (1987) (explaining
that pursuant to their duty of care, directors must act with “informed judgment”).
254. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 8, at 976 (“The courts . . . have no particular
familiarity, much less expertise, with the charity’s operating needs.”); id. at 977 (“[S]tate attorneys
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government actors who serve limited terms in positions that render them directly
or indirectly accountable to the electorate (especially state attorneys general)
may adhere to a concept of “public benefit” that is more parochial, and therefore
less objective, than that of charity fiduciaries.255
With respect to the third factor, the long-term effect of the choice of the
system on charitable donations, a distinction between charitable trusts and
charitable corporations is once again apropos.256 A single settlor of a charitable
trust may choose the trust form to maximize the probability that her charitable
preferences will be honored in perpetuity.257 Without meaningful assurances
that the static charter fidelity norm will broadly apply over time, some
prospective settlors may simply decide not to fund charitable trusts. For the
class of such settlors, generally imposing the static charter fidelity norm on
trustees may increase efficiency by encouraging the initial funding of charitable
trusts.258
Similarly, with respect to nonprofit charitable corporations, people may
decrease their donations to corporate charities if they can alter their charitable
purposes and use donations to advance new causes that donors did not initially
intend to support.259 Without assurances that donations will be spent as
contemplated by donors, some donors may not subsidize worthy projects as
extensively as they otherwise would.260 The reduction in donations is inefficient
because it results in an undersupply of those charitable goods deemed most
efficient by the market for donations. However, this efficiency argument is far
from convincing.261 In brief, (1) it is unclear that those who donate to charitable
nonprofit corporations really assume or prefer the existence of static fiduciary

general have no necessary expertise, much less the resources, to address the myriad concerns of the
hundreds of thousands of charities that function in the United States today.”).
255. See id. at 939 (“When faced with the flight or loss of significant nonprofit assets from a
locality, state regulators, courts, and the legislature sometimes mobilize to secure the border.”). Cf.
Atkinson, supra note 14, at 95 (arguing that elected public officials may cater to powerful political
constituencies, rather than those most deserving of charitable funds); Brody, Whose Public?, supra
note 8, at 947–48 (observing the political realities facing elected attorneys general).
256. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466–67 (Del. 1991) (contrasting the probable
expectations of the settlor of a charitable trust and the founder of a charitable corporation).
257. Cf. Manne, supra note 8, at 271 (arguing that upholding a founder’s intent encourages the
formation and funding of charities).
258. This observation does not imply that, on balance, imposing the static charter fidelity norm
on trustees of charitable trusts necessarily is efficient given the costs of doing so. Instead, it simply
acknowledges the plausibility of the position that applying the static charter fidelity norm to trustees
of charitable trusts likely encourages some settlors to give.
259. For an initial exposition and preliminary response to this argument, see Buckles, supra
note 20, at 217–18.
260. Frost, supra note 8, at 951.
261. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–18 (criticizing the reliance-based efficiency
justification for obedience norms).
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obedience norms;262 (2) the costs of a system requiring ex ante, substantive
government approval of purpose/mission changes may outweigh the benefits of
such a system, not only in fact, but also as perceived by donors; and (3) donors
who desire to protect themselves against redirection of charitable donations can
do so by restricting their charitable gifts.263 On balance, the static obedience
norms are not easily justified on grounds of efficiency in the case of charitable
corporations.
D. Summary
Ensuring at least some public benefit is the most justifiable purpose of
fiduciary obedience norms. The charity advancement norm and its negative
corollary—and generally the legality norm—plainly serve this purpose and
should apply to all charity fiduciaries. Reliance-based equity may also justify
certain obedience norms, most clearly the charity advancement norm and its
negative corollary. Equity concerns probably do not justify any static obedience
norm as applied to the management of unrestricted gifts to charitable
corporations. Similarly, although imposing some form of charter fidelity and
mission fidelity norms may promote efficiency, it is doubtful that applying static
obedience norms to directors of nonprofit charitable corporations does so. The
dynamic charter fidelity and dynamic mission fidelity norms, however, should
apply to these directors. Efficiency justifications may or may not support
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts,264 but
there is no obvious reason to bind them to the historic mission fidelity norm
when trust purposes are broadly phrased. Nonetheless, if a charitable trust has
broadly phrased purposes, holding its trustees to the dynamic mission fidelity
norm would likely enhance efficiency.
V. IMPLEMENTING FIDUCIARY OBEDIENCE NORMS
Evaluating the possible purposes of obedience norms informs the
determination of what norms should apply to whom. With the conclusions of
Part IV in mind, the legal analyst is poised to ask a series of questions ultimately
designed to help judges and legislators formulate a cogent legal framework for
implementing fiduciary obedience norms. Articulating these distinct questions
not only aids the analysis, but may also help establish common ground among
courts and commentators that currently hold divergent views.
The following questions should be answered in crafting an approach for
imposing obedience norms on charity fiduciaries:
262. See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 81 (stating that donors to charitable corporations may
prefer “fiduciary freedom to change purposes,” or at least harbor indifference to such freedom).
263. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 218.
264. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting that the equity justification for
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts would vanish should the
law abandon the traditional doctrine of cy pres and decline to replace it with some similar
alternative).
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(1) Should charity fiduciaries have the power to alter a charity’s
purposes or mission (and devote assets accordingly) without obtaining
ex ante, substantive governmental approval of the change?
(2) If charity fiduciaries should have the power to alter a charity’s
purposes or mission (and devote assets accordingly) without obtaining
ex ante, substantive governmental approval of the change, should their
exercise of discretion nonetheless be subject to governmental review?
(3) If the decision by charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes
or mission (and devote assets accordingly) is reviewable either ex ante
or ex post, how much deference should a reviewing governmental
agent extend to charity fiduciaries?
(4) If the decision by charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes
or mission (and devote assets accordingly) is reviewable either ex ante
or ex post, what grounds justify the decision of charity fiduciaries to
change a charity’s purposes/mission?
Concerning the first question, the analysis of Part IV of this Article suggests
the propriety of maintaining a distinction between charitable corporations and
charitable trusts.265 Part IV supports the view that directors of charitable
nonprofit corporations should not be governed by static fiduciary obedience
norms (except with respect to restricted gifts).266 As applied to corporate
fiduciaries, the public benefit, equity, and efficiency arguments probably do not
justify the static norms. In the case of trustees of charitable trusts,
reliance-based efficiency concerns may support imposition of the static charter
fidelity norm, but neither equity nor efficiency considerations justify applying
the historic mission fidelity norm as an independent constraint.
At this point, those who have argued for imposing static fiduciary obedience
norms on all charity fiduciaries may take heart that rejecting certain static
obedience norms does not end the relevant inquiries. To conclude that directors
of charitable corporations should have the power to alter a charity’s purposes
and mission, and to devote corporate assets accordingly, does not establish that
doing so is a proper exercise of fiduciary discretion in any given case.267
Similarly, that trustees of charitable trusts with broad purposes clauses should
have the power to alter their charitable missions does not mean that every
mission change that falls within such purposes is prudent. Although in each case
fiduciaries should have the power to change charitable paths without first
obtaining governmental blessing for their decisions, their exercise of discretion
265. See supra text accompanying notes 302–04.
266. Thus, the analysis generally favors the approach taken by the PLNO and the court in
Bethany Medical Center Inc., rather than the approach taken by the court in Manhattan Eye.
Compare supra Part III.B.3.c., with supra Part III.B.3.b.
267. Consider the following analogy to the management of an investment portfolio: that a
board of directors has the power to authorize charity officers to invest in a hedge fund does not
mean that it is prudent for the board to do so every time a hedge fund promoter pitches an
investment to the charity. Power must not be confused with prudence.
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nonetheless should be subject to governmental review, most logically, judicial
review.268 Doing so treats their decisions regarding purposes and mission
similarly to how the law treats other decisions that they make. Although the
primary responsibility for adopting and amending charitable goals rests with
charity fiduciaries, they should not be free to act irresponsibly in overseeing a
change in a charity’s purposes and mission, just as they are not free to act
irresponsibly in overseeing a change in the charity’s pool of investments or
employees. An attorney general should be able to question a decision to alter
charitable purposes and mission, once made, just as she may question other
decisions of charity fiduciaries.
Ultimately, two questions persist. The primary purpose of articulating these
last two questions is not to answer them here, but to suggest how courts and state
legislatures should think through the issues in order to answer them. As to the
penultimate question, those convinced that charity directors and trustees are
uniquely well suited to assess the merits of changes in purposes and mission may
favor one of two standards of judicial review. One standard would accord
heightened deference to charity managers,perhaps by authorizing courts to find
a violation of fiduciary duty only when managers have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. Those who see no real difference between a fiduciary’s judgment
concerning charitable purposes and mission and that concerning any other matter
may favor another approach to judicial review, one that evaluates all
disinterested exercises of fiduciary discretion under the same standard.269 Those
who desire heightened protection of the reliance interests of donors and other
stakeholders might favor a standard of judicial review that places an affirmative
burden on charity fiduciaries to establish the justification for a change in
purposes or mission.270
Although the issue of what standard of judicial review should apply in these
cases is theoretically distinct from the issue of whether such review should be
ex ante or ex post, a standard of judicial review that accords some deference to
the judgment of fiduciaries appears to be consistent with the assumptions that
268. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 84 (advocating for the imposition of a duty on
directors of charitable corporations to consider charitable mission, subject to deferential judicial
review).
269. Most decisions of directors of incorporated charities are subject to the business judgment
rule. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 365 (explaining the business
judgment rule); Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 644 & n.76 (citing cases that have applied the business
judgment rule to directors’ decisions).
270. Additional protection of donors’ reliance interests could take the form of requiring a
charitable corporation to notify the state attorney general of a proposed charter amendment or other
significant change. The attorney general could then petition a court for an injunction if he or she
believes the change is improper. Such an approach approximates adoption of the static or historic
fidelity norms, insofar as a governmental actor (the state attorney general) functionally has the
power through adjudication to ensure that a change will become effective only if another
governmental actor,a court,permits it. Some states essentially follow this approach in certain
contexts. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West 2013) (requiring notice to the Attorney General
before a public benefit corporation disposes of substantially all of its assets).
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would lead one to favor dynamic obedience norms over static norms.271 The
argument for applying dynamic obedience norms to directors of charitable
corporations ultimately implies that charitable boards are better suited than
courts and attorneys general to monitor and redirect charitable paths. If that
premise is correct, some degree of judicial deference to the decisions of directors
is warranted.
Concerning the final question, state law should articulate the grounds that
justify the decision of charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes and
mission, regardless of the standard of judicial review that is applied or whether
such review is performed ex ante or ex post. The choice of grounds for justifying
a change in purposes and mission is theoretically distinct from the decision of
whether to implement ex ante or ex post judicial review of the change.
Nonetheless, the two issues are intertwined. Those who favor static norms will
likely desire to limit the grounds for changing a charity’s purposes and
mission,272 whereas those who favor dynamic norms will likely advocate for
broader grounds justifying change.273
To illustrate, the doctrine of cy pres, which governs charitable trusts,
embraces quite narrow grounds for changing charitable purposes,274 an
unsurprising reality if one observes that the static charter fidelity norm governs
charitable trusts.275 But if one is persuaded by the argument of Part IV that
dynamic obedience norms should govern directors of charitable corporations,
one should embrace a broader set of grounds for altering a corporate charity’s
purposes and mission and consequent deployment of assets than those
recognized by the doctrine of cy pres. Relevant facts include (1) inefficiencies
in maintaining the status quo (high operating costs, difficulty in retaining
competent personnel, inability to maintain adequate facilities, etc.); (2) the
ability of other institutions (government, nonprofits, and for-profit firms) to
serve the community previously served by the charity desiring to change course;
271. Cf. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 83 (proposing that directors “enjoy presumptive
deference in defining and, within limits, amending” charitable mission); Sugin, supra note 8, at 921
(arguing in favor of a concept of dynamic mission fidelity under which “judicial review [is] highly
deferential to the reasoned decisions of charity boards”).
272. The grounds inhering in the “quasi-cy pres” approach applicable to dissolving New York
charitable corporations provide an example. See, e.g., In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y.,
Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861, 864 (N.Y. 1986) (reversing an intermediate appellate court that permitted a
dissolving charitable corporation to donate part of its assets to another charity that did not meet
New York’s statutory requirements).
273. See, e.g., Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 83–84 (listing relevant mission-related
factors); Sugin, supra note 8, at 921 (“Obedience as fidelity empowers boards to exercise their
judgment in the name of mission by allowing them to depart from business law constraints.”).
274. See supra Part II.B.2.
275. This observation does not imply that existing charitable trust law strikes the optimal
balance between honoring donors’ reliance interests and enabling trustees to manage charitable
trusts efficiently. The law could still protect the reliance interests of donors to some degree by
coupling ex ante judicial review of proposed amendments to a trust instrument with expanded
grounds for changing charitable purposes.
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(3) the importance of the needs that would be met with the change in purpose
relative to the needs currently being met; (4) the ability of other institutions to
meet the needs that would be addressed with the change in purpose; and (5) the
efficiency with which the charity could pursue the new purpose.276
Although these factors bear upon the reasonableness of a decision to change
a charity’s purposes, it is most important to emphasize (1) that the law must be
clear, so that both fiduciaries and governmental actors know what is expected of
charity fiduciaries, and (2) that the adoption of dynamic obedience norms
suggests a measure of confidence in the decision-making capacity of
fiduciaries,confidence that implies their ability to evaluate all of the relevant
facts. Courts and legislatures should keep these points in mind as they impose
obedience norms on charity fiduciaries.
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The law of obedience norms governing charity fiduciaries is far from settled
and coherent. State laws embrace the legality norm and the charity advancement
norm, and some form of charter fidelity norm. The static charter fidelity norm
governs charitable trusts by default. Many states appear to accept the dynamic
charter fidelity norm as applied strictly to the formal requirements for amending
a charitable corporation’s articles of incorporation. However, states differ in the
constraints that they impose on corporate directors seeking to deploy charitable
assets for purposes other than those traditionally served by their charities. Some
states clearly implement the static charter fidelity norm in these contexts,
whereas others favor the dynamic charter fidelity norm. The law is ordinarily
unclear as to whether charity fiduciaries must advance a charitable mission more
specific than its charter purpose(s).
An analysis of the potential justifications for obedience norms affirms the
legitimacy of the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary, as well
as (in general) the legality norm. The efficiency justifications for broadly
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts are
plausible, though not definitive. However, dynamic charter fidelity norms
should apply to directors of charitable corporations. The historic mission fidelity
norm, as a norm independent of charter fidelity, should not apply to charity
fiduciaries. Rather, imposing the dynamic mission fidelity norm on all charity
fiduciaries, both directors and trustees, is sensible.
Deciding what norms should govern which charity fiduciaries does not
complete the necessary analysis. States must also decide the degree of deference
that courts should extend to the decisions of charity fiduciaries, and must
determine the grounds that justify a decision by charity fiduciaries to change a
charity’s purposes and mission. This Article suggests how states should
approach these design questions.
276. This list is not exhaustive, but is representative of the factors that boards should consider
when deciding upon a change in charitable purpose and mission.
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This Article does not focus on whether the law’s implementation of obedience
norms should occur through imposition of a “duty of obedience” on directors of
charitable nonprofit corporations, in addition to the duties of care and loyalty.
Nevertheless, this Article’s analysis suggests that the tentative draft of the PLNO
strikes the proper balance by recognizing the legitimacy of certain obedience
norms, yet declining to articulate a distinct “duty of obedience” governing
charity fiduciaries. The dynamic charter fidelity norm and the dynamic mission
fidelity norm are best implemented in a system that confers on charity fiduciaries
both primary responsibility for forging a charity’s path and discretion in how
best to do so. The twin fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, exercised in good
faith, provide sufficient standards for evaluating directors’ decisions under such
a system. To impose an additional “duty of obedience” on directors arguably
implies that decisions concerning mission and purpose are somehow much
different from other exercises of discretion. It is doubtful that they are, and
therefore the more traditional expression of fiduciary duties should be favored.

